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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This report seeks to identify potential market opportunities for Genesee County within the 
automotive economy, but external to General Motors. Through a combination of interview, 
survey, and archival data, it identifies product markets with three characteristics. First, demand 
from suppliers is likely to increase due to increased sourcing rather than manufacturing by the 
automotive assemblers. Second, capacity levels in the independent supplier sector are unlikely to 
be adequate to meet those demands. Third, the skills and product-experience of the GM labor 
force in Genesee constitute an available, trained workforce. 
The report also identifies companies, including domestic and transplant suppliers, that are 
likely beneficiaries of the increased outsourcing by the manufacturers; are likely to be capacity- 
constrained; and are likely to seek new locations. 
The ultimate goal of the study is to provide some direction to Genesee's efforts to find 
near-term replacement activity and jobs for expected losses at General Motors. The strategy 
reflects a recognition that Genesee's immediate attractions are its location with respect to the 
automotive facilities of the manufacturers, and a workforce both acclimated to the industrial culture 
of the automotive industry and experienced and skilled in its work requirements. In the final 
analysis, Genesee must diversify away from its heavy reliance on the automotive economy, but 
diversification within that economy is an important step, both to alleviate the impacts of the coming 
losses at GM and to achieve a diversified economy. 
Background 
The Genesee County economy is heavily dependent on manufacturing, its manufacturing 
activity is almost exclusively automotive, and its automotive activity is virtually all General Motors. 
GM, the major employer in Genesee County, faces serious competitive threats in the domestic 
automotive market. 
In 1978, the record prduction year for the Big Three, GM assembled about 6.9 million 
passenger cars in the United States. In 1988, GM made almost 1.9 million fewer cars in the 
United States, a decrease of about 27%. The U.S. light vehicle market fell some 6% from 1988 to 
1989, to about 14.5 million vehicles. The share of the passenger car market held by GM's North 
American production fell from 33.5% to 32.3%, accounting for some 127,000 of its 358,000 total 
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sales decrease. GM performed better in the light duty truck market, increasing its share from 
34.7% to 35.7%. While it made some 20,000 fewer trucks in 1989 than in 1988, its share 
increase avoided the loss of another 45,000 vehicles. 
These lost sales inevitably convert to job losses. The 378,000 fewer light vehicles sold in 
1989 is roughly equivalent to 1.5 full production assembly plants. While rational production 
allocation might prevent the actual closing of a plant, the decreased production eventually results in 
fewer jobs, as tasks are reconfigured to reflect lowered production volumes. Furthermore, 
reduced vehicle assembly decreases demand for parts and components from suppliers, and 
eventually converts to lower employment at these plants as well. 
GM faces continuing challenges to its market dominance. In the early 1980s it was 
fashionable to expect that younger buyers, who were more likely to purchase imports than were 
older buyers, would shift their preferences back to the Big Three as they aged. This was 
predicated on the assumption that their needs and tastes would change as they aged. However, the 
Japanese manufacturers began offering larger and more luxurious cars, and such a shift has not 
developed. While total GM sales, regardless of production location, accounted for approximately 
36% of 1988 U.S. car sales, they accounted for just 25% of sales to buyers under the age of 45. 
As GM buyers age, younger buyers continue purchasing imports, and as new cohorts of younger 
buyers enter the market, Big Three and GM sales are likely to continue declining. 
However, GM has enormous resources, and it would be foolish to assume that its 
continued decline is inevitable. GM quality is improving, especially in the Buick Division, led by 
Buick City's LeSabre, which ranked second in the 1989 J.D. Poweis Initial Quality Survey. The 
naming of a new Chairman and, perhaps, President, and the negotiation of a new labor agreement 
are on the 1990 calendar, and these present opportunities for the revitalization of current efforts and 
the development of new strategies and directions. 
The competitive pressures on the traditional automotive industry both to improve quality 
and reduce costs will convert to further job losses, ones that will not come back when the market -- 
or GM -- recovers. The 1987 GM-UAW contract provides some individual protection for 
represented workers at GM, but there will be a steady erosion of the jobs that the corporation 
provides at any given facility or within a geographical concentration of facilities, as attrition and 
retirement lower employment levels. 
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Outsourcing -- purchasing a part or component from an outside supplier, rather than 
producing it in-house -- is a major GM strategic response to its competitive situation, a response 
that will shift jobs from GM to outside suppliers. Outsourcing is especially problematic for 
1 Genesee because it currently has such a rich GM endowment and thin independent supplier base. 
That makes outsourcing a direct threat to levels of employment within Genesee, because Genesee 
lacks the supplier community to bid on and perhaps retain some of the work lost at GM. The 
increases in the levels of outsourcing that might occur from the Genesee GM endowment make it 
even doubtful that the majority of the work lost to Genesee might be gained by neighboring areas 
that would provide jobs to Genesee residents. 
If we combine all three of these factors -- market, productivity, and outsourcing -- then the 
permanent loss of GM jobs in Genesee over the next few years could well number somewhat 
above 20,000, roughly one-third of the current GM workforce. While the new contract might 
slow these losses, and future developments might lessen them, they cannot be entirely avoided. 
The Challenge to Genesee 
What can Genesee do in the face of these losses? An obvious answer is to diversify, 
certainly away from reliance on the fortunes of one company, and surely away from the 
dependence on the cyclical automotive industry, and probably even away from manufacturing. 
However, there are numerous problems with these prescriptions. Diversification away from 
manufacturing involves time to develop the workforce and resources to support such a move, and 
probably would result in lower income for a large segment of the Genesee population. 
Diversification within manufacturing but away from automotive also requires time to develop new 
markets and the selling and servicing skills they require. Even diversification away from one 
company is difficult, as that company's dominance of the local economy represents an entry barrier 
for other employers. 
We are persuaded that a middling strategy of diversified manufacturing less tied to the 
automotive economy is the long-term direction that Genesee should pursue. But we also feel that 
diversification within the automotive sector should be an important part of that strategy. In the 
long term, a diversified manufacturing base is important, but we believe that manufacturing for the 
'A recent review of GM facilities ranked it fxst as a threat to employment levels,ahead of market 
and productivity improvements, at eight of the 12 GM production facilities in Genesee; it ranked 
first for all three of the plants identified as most likely to close. 
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automotive sector will and should remain a core activity of the Genesee economy. That, after all, 
is where Genesee has some comparative strengths and experience. In the near term, we believe 
that replacement manufacturing within the automotive sector can be more readily secured, and that 
is important far transitional job and income support as the diversification strategy develops. Since 
GM is so dominant in the Genesee economy, such replacement activity is likely to be in the 
supplier sector of the automotive economy rather than in activity by other vehicle assemblers. 
Genesee once had an independent supplier base, but that base has gradually been absorbed 
by GM -- AC Rochester and Inland Fisher Guide, Coldwater Road were once independent supplier 
companies, for example. Suppliers are now noticeably absent from Genesee's automotive 
economy, and recent attempts to attract them have not been very successful. The conventional 
wisdom is that suppliers have been reluctant to locate in an area so dominated by GM and the 
UAW. The pressure on wages, the perceived labor climate, and, in some cases, the reluctance to 
rely on an urbanized, unionized, significantly minority workforce have all kept suppliers away 
from Flint, or so the conventional wisdom would have it. As is often the case, there is a large 
kernel of truth to the conventional wisdom. 
In view of this, why would suppliers now be willing to locate in Genesee? None of these 
factors have changed, so why would it make sense to pursue suppliers? We feel that the increased 
outsourcing by the manufacturers -- a particular threat to Genesee -- sufficiently alters the situation 
so that some suppliers may well discover that Genesee is an attractive location. 
To be sure, there is likely to be surplus capacity in the supplier industry because of the 
declining market share of their traditional customers and the establishment of U.S. production 
facilities by many Japanese suppliers. Even so, it is doubtful that this surplus capacity will be 
adequate to meet the demands of increased outsourcing. In some cases, the available capacity will 
be too small; in other cases, the available capacity will be inappropriate for reasons of technology 
and/or location. Some additional capacity will be required to meet the specific demands of 
increased outsourcing. 
An important issue for Genesee, then, is how much of these additional supplier 
investments it can secure. Genesee has advantages and disadvantages, to be sure, but it will have 
the unfortunate "advantage" of available facilities and workers. To increase the chances that these 
advantages secure new investment, and that investment will provide stable, well-paid jobs. 
Genesee must effectively market itself. That requires careful assessment of what Genesee has to 
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offer and identification of companies to which it should be offered. Both the assessment and 
identification of prospects must be as product specific as possible. 
Overview 
Chapter Two describes the current competitive challenges to the Big Three and GM in the 
market place, and likely responses in the areas of productivity improvement and increased 
outsourcing. All three of these are sources of potential job loss for the domestic industry and 
Genesee. It then provides a description of the supplier industry, a possible source of replacement 
economic activity for Genesee. 
Chapter Three provides an introduction to the issue of overcapacity for both automotive 
manufacturers and their suppliers. It further presents survey data bearing on supplier capacity 
plans and relative advantages and disadvantages of Frostbelt locations like Genesee, and 
information on the supplier selection criteria used by the manufacturers. 
Chapter Four provides an analysis of Genesee's current GM facilities, identifying their 
products, capabilities, and employment, and providing an assessment of the risk of outsourcing. 
This chapter draws on a set of interviews we conducted with five industry experts. These experts 
include a retired GM executive in manufacturing engineering, a former president of an independent 
supplier company, a former vice president of two major independent suppliers, an expert in 
stamping, and an expert in engines. These interviewees were selected because of their knowledge 
of GM and Genesee as well as their particular experiences. 
Chapter Five examines the advantages and disadvantages of Genesee as an automotive 
production location, reviews the problems and threats common to its GM base, and discusses 
potential strategies of responding. 
Chapter Six reviews supplier product markets, identifying five that merit particular attention 
in Genesee's efforts to replace probable losses at GM. It discusses strategies for attracting 
suppliers and methods of identifying companies that may offer opportunities to secure supplier 
locations. 
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Chapter 2. U.S. Automotive Industry: Threats and Opportunities 
Introduction 
The strategic decisions and competitive success of General Motors over the coming half- 
decade or so will largely determine the automotive future of Genesee. GM's competitive success 
will place a realistic upper limit on the business available to its internal assembly and supplier 
plants. To be sure, some GM supplier plants will secure business from GM's competitors and 
from independent suppliers, but this potential business will be balanced by GM business lost by 
these or other internal supplier plants to outside suppliers. On the whole, then, there is little reason 
to expect the volume of business for GM suppliers to grow in relation to GM vehicle sales. In 
fact, it may well fall in relation to GM vehicle sales, should GM increase its reliance on captive 
vehicles sourced from abroad. Further, GM internal or captive supplier business for some parts 
and components may even fall in relation to GM vehicle production. This could happen if GM's 
strategic decisions with respect to its proper level of vertical integration continue to emphasize 
lowering its current level, even though this has somewhat moderated of late. 
The overall performance of GM supplier plants will surely reflect a combination of some 
plants that prosper and grow and some that perform poorly or fail. The broad range of supplier 
plants located in Genesee virtually assures that some of its GM supplier plants will be relatively 
successful, while some will be less successful and perhaps fail. Of course, success and failure 
might be due to the plant's own performance, to technical and material changes in products, to GM 
divisional or corporate decisions, or simply to excess capacity in the supplier industry. 
But GM's strategic decisions and competitive success will reflect, depend upon, and itself 
influence general developments in the automotive industry. This chapter, drawing heavily h m  the 
results of the 198811989 OSAT survey of North American automotive suppliers, highlights some 
of the major competitive issues likely to face the industry over the next five years or so.' This 
survey serves numerous purposes and informs other sections of this report, but the material 
discussed here emphasizes broad developments that are likely to foxm the competitive context for 
GM's strategic decisions and market success. 
1 
Appendix I contains the survey inrtnunent 
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We think that this information provides potential benefits to Genesee economic 
development and planning specialists as they consider their strategic situation over the next four to 
five years. While these supplier reports are not necessarily accurate descriptions of objective 
reality, they are the respondents' perceptions of that reality, and are important in a number of 
ways. First, they identify suppliers' views on numerous issues. These general views provide 
information as to the range of opinions across many companies, and thus provide a useful check 
on the "conventional wisdom," an important step in developing a more refined environmental 
appraisal. That, in turn, is a critical element of forward planning. Second, it provides information 
that suggests the planning premises of North American suppliers, so that economic development 
agents and planners can take these into account in developing and formulating their own strategies 
and decisions. Third, much of the information is targeted to international competitors, and that may 
be particularly beneficial as we experience increasingly international competition for domestic 
vehicle and component markets. 
This discussion is structured around the three threats to GM employment in Genesee 
identified in an earlier report2 These are market threats, reflecting GM's performance in the 
market, its required levels of domestic vehicle assembly, and thus demand for parts and 
components from its allied supplier base; productivity, GM's need to increase its ratio of outputs to 
inputs, and the resulting focus on reducing the labor content of its production; and outsourcing, a 
shift in GM's pattern of buying production goods from outside suppliers versus making them 
inside GM. The discussion concludes with a brief overview of the U.S. supplier industry, a 
potential target for Genesee's diversification efforts. 
Market Issues 
The traditional domestic automotive manufacturers continue to face severe competitive 
pressure from each other and from foreign nameplate manufacturers. We see no easing of this 
pressure in the next five years or so, nor do we see a dramatic turn-around in the competitive 
fortunes of the domestics. To be sure, 1988 saw an improved passenger car market share for the 
domestics, up some 3,6%, but this offers small comfort to Genesee. First, Ford and Chrysler 
were the beneficiaries of this improved performance, not GM. GM's share of the car market fell 
from 36.8% to 33.4%, a serious one year decline. Second, this improved sales performance was 
accompanied by a worsened U.S. production performance, as U.S. share of total Big Three build 
L 
Cole, D. E., M. S. Flynn. S. P. McAlinb,  and D. J. Andm, , R e p t  to the 
Charles Slewan Mott Foundation, Decanber, 1987. 
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fell 2.5%, roughly one assembly plant's annual output for a 10 million car market. GM's U.S. 
build declined 2% of its total build. The domestic manufacturers increased their sourcing of 
vehicles from their own facilities in Canada and Mexico, as well as from the facilities of foreign 
manufacturers elsewhere, and thus, while their U.S. sales increased, their U.S. manufacturing 
activity actually fell. 
The Japanese have failed to meet their Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) target of 2.3 
million vehicles since 1987, and this has been viewed as evidence of the increased competitiveness 
of domestic vehicles. However, the Japanese government allocates this quota to companies, and 
much of the shortfall is due to the poor market performance of Nissan. Many observers believe 
that Honda and Toyota could relatively easily have sold the Nissan shortfall had that been 
permitted. 
There is little question that the Japanese manufacturers remain the primary competition for 
the traditional domestics, and no plausible scenario suggests that this will alter in the near future. 
However, the nature of the competitive challenge posed by Japan is changing dramatically, as the 
Japanese automotive companies have established a significant manufacturing presence in North 
3 America. These new North American facilities of Japanese manufacturers, or NAM's , present a 
heightened challenge to the domestics. They meet the quality and productivity targets of plants in 
Japan, enjoy the lower operating costs of greenfield sites and younger labor forces, and may mute 
sales resistance to "foreign cars." 
Table 2.1 provides our estimates of North American NAM capacity by 1993. These 
estimates are based on public announcements and existing capacity, but include an extra 200,000 
light trucks from Toyota. This addition to NAM capacity reflects our belief that Toyota will soon 
announce its often-rumored second U.S. plant, and that it will be a truck plant. Some of the 
Japanese manufacturers, perhaps especially Nissan and Toyota, are committed to being full-line 
manufacturers, and we think that indicates that they will aggressively compete in the light truck 
market. On the other hand, we do not expect the Lafayette, Indiana, Subaru-Isuzu plant to reach 
its potential 240,000 vehicles by 1993. We think this plant can reach that capacity only if GM 
sources Isuzu vehicles from it. 
3 
For "New American Manufacturers," the U.S. and Canadian ~ s e m b l y  operatims of J a p s e  and K o m  manufacturers, such as Mazde's Flat 
Rock, Michigan plant. 
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In any case, increased NAM competition in light trucks represents a threat to Flint's Truck 
and Bus Assembly. Flint Truck and Bus lost the replacement for the Suburban to Janesville, WI 
and this might have meant the end of production at the Van Slyke Road facility. However, GM 
will transfer production of its full-size "G" van from Lordstown, OH to Truck and Bus Assembly. 
In view of the continuing shift to smaller passenger vans, it is still the case that the best chance for 
this facility remaining open through the 1990s will be that GM requires a second plant for its APV 
van. NAM success in the light truck segment would likely decrease the odds that this second plant 
will be required, as would the success of Ford, Chrysler, or import alternatives. 
Table 2.1 
1993 Estimated 
New American Manufacturer Capacity 
(thousands of vehicles) 
Table 2.1 breaks this capacity into vehicles that will be sold through the manufacturer's 
own dealerships, and those that will be supplied for retailing as captives to traditional domestic 
manufacturers. This permits distinguishing manufacturing and sales shares and reflects the 
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produced Ford Robe and Mazda MX-6) will continue. The captive versions of these vehicles 
typically have higher traditional domestic supplier content than do their Japanese nameplate 
counterparts. 
Many analysts forecast a decrease in Japanese imports as the NAM's achieve full 
production, perhaps from the 1988 level of 2.1 million to 1.5 or so million vehicles. This decrease 
would not be trivial, since 300,000 vehicles would sustain about 1.25 assembly plants at current 
capacity planning levels. This expectation rests on the argument that the Japanese will essentially 
substitute some NAM production and sales for imported vehicles. However, we are skeptical that 
this will occur, and see little decrease in the current level of Japanese imports with increased NAM 
production. In fact, it may be more likely that they would increase to the VER limit of 2.3 million 
than fall to 1.5 million. First, the Japanese employment system pressures the manufacturers to 
maintain their employment levels in Japan, and we do not see market growth in Japan or other 
export destinations that would support significant reduction in exports to the United States. 
Second, a number of the Japanese manufacturers have ambitious growth plans, and it is difficult to 
create a credible scenario for meeting these goals that does not include level or increased U.S. 
sales. Third, some NAM production will be exports to Japan, and probably to Europe as well, and 
we think the Japanese will feel that this "export generation" obviates the need for "import 
substitution." 
Underlying whatever changes there may be in the level of Japanese imports is an important 
shift in the composition of these imports. Japanese passenger car imports to date have been 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the subcompact and compact segments of the market, with these 
two segments accounting for about 92% of their 1988 NAM and import passenger car sales. 
Honda has recently introduced the Legend, Mazda the 929, Toyota the Lexus, and Nissan the 
Infinity. These cars represent a significant strategic shift for the Japanese manufacturers because 
they are targeted directly at the lower to middle luxury car segment of the market. We expect the 
Japanese to be quite successful with these cars, perhaps taking as much as 26% of the luxury 
market by 1993. Intermediates, like the Toyota Cressida and Nissan Maxima will probably capture 
about 15% of this segment. To be sure, many of these sales will be captured from European 
manufacturers, but some will come from the traditional domestics as well. 
The luxury segment of the market is important in a number of ways. First, success in that 
segment can convert to sales in other segments as well because of the prestige it confers on the 
manufacturer's entire line. For example, some of the GM car divisions' problems in mid-size cars 
like the LeSabre have been attributed to the poor performance of the Cadillac marque in the early 
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1980s. Second, this segment contributes to the profit performance of the company far beyond its 
unit contribution to sales. This contribution to profit in turn supports lower profit production in 
other segments, and the loss of that internally generated "subsidy" might increase pressures to rely 
on captive vehicles and/or lower volume strategies in smaller cars. Therefore, significant erosion 
of sales in the luxury segment could undermine the domestic production of vehicles in other 
segments. Third, the loss of these profits would undoubtedly lead to severe pressure to reduce 
costs rapidly. That would probably lead to cuts in product development expenditures, and that 
might create further problems later. It would also probably restrict investment dollars available to 
supplier plants and raise the likelihood of increased outsourcing. 
Of course, the Japanese are not our only international competitors, nor is Canada the only 
alternative production site available to the domestic manufacturers. We expect the Europeans to 
decrease their level of imports, losing sales to Japanese imports in the luxury segment, and to 
NAM's and to imports from South Korea and elsewhere in the less expensive segments. From a 
domestic automotive manufacturer's viewpoint, the losses the Europeans suffer will provide little 
in the way of captured sales. Mexico may increasingly become a production source for the 
domestics: the past few years have witnessed the shift of GM A-car (e.g., the Chevrolet Celebrity), 
Chrysler K-car (e.g., the Plymouth Reliant), and Mercury Tracer (Lynx replacement) production 
from the United States to Mexico. 
Table 2.2 presents the U.S, light vehicle market for 1988.~ These data reflect the 
manufacturing source, rather than the marketing unit, because it is the manufacturer's U.S. build 
that determines demand for U.S. assembly jobs and production goods from the independent and 
allied supplier ind~stries.~ Table 2.2 also displays our projection for the 1993 vehicle market. We 
expect that there will be a cyclical downturn in 1990/1991, but that the industry will have largely 
recovered from it by 1993. We see a 1993 market that is some 4.5% larger, with light trucks 
maintaining about a 32% share. NAM's about double their market share, moving to 15.5% in cars 
and 9.6% in light trucks. Imports slightly increase their share of the car market to just about 
3196, while taking a somewhat larger share (15.4%) of the truck market. Traditional domestic 
4 
Detailed breakouts for the Canadian market m not readily available, but it generally is some 1046 of the U.S. marku, with a somewhat higher 
proponion of imp& cars (33.7% in 1987) md a somewhat lower proportion of i m p o d  mcks (10.3% in 1987). The Canadian market is a 
source of danand for U.S. independent and allied suppliers, as well as some assembly plants. 
'The m n u f a u u m q  purchaac vehicles f o r d  fmn olhu manufaciurcn (@ve iaprm nd NAMs). uxl those vehicles are M d y  included 
in sales figures. Such vehicles ue assigned to their manufacturing soura in Table 2 Howeva, vehicles sourced from Canada and Mexico are 
included in the trpditional dmestic category becluw of the dfiadty of accurately idauifying them in published sales data 
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vehicles lose share in cars, falling to 53.6%, and even more in light trucks, to 75%. To be sure, 
the traditional manufacturers' retail share of the total light vehicle market (64.0%) will be higher 
than their manufacturing share (60.5%), since they will likely source about 570,000 North 
American NAM cars and light trucks. Traditional manufacturers' retail market share will also be 
higher to the extent that they successfully market captive imports sourced from offshore 
manuf acturen. 
Table 2.2 
1988 and 1993 U.S. Light Vehicle Markets 
by Production Sources 
(millions of vehicles) 
Our market estimate suggests that the Big Three will produce and market in 1993 about 
90% of the total light vehicles that they did in 1988. That converts to a 10% loss of jobs due to 
market factors on the average, if everything else remains constant. Of course, these job losses will 
not be smooth, but "lumpy," as shifts are ended, plants are closed, and substantially lower 
production leads to job restructuring. Just as surely, everything else will not remain constant. 
Nevertheless, this provides a useful, if crude, general estimate of the impact of lost market share 
on job levels in the industry. 
GM production and market shares have eroded for some years now, and we do not expect 
a major recovery in either share in the immediate future. Figure 2.1 displays GM's car market 
share by division since 1978. GM has issued numerous statements over the past few years that 
suggest that it is concentrating on a higher-profit, lower-volume strategy, and that its target for car 
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Figure 2.1: GM U.S. Total Passenger Car Market Share 
by Car Division 
in the market, and GM is finally offering the first 4-door versions of its W-body, the Chevrolet 
Lumina, the Buick Regal, and the Olds Cutlass Supreme. If these W-cars and the rear-wheel drive 
GM300 program (Chewlet Caprice), slated for 1990 mid-year introduction, do well, GM might 
just increase its market share beyond its announced targets. At the same time, it appears likely that 
GM will increase its reliance on captive vehicles from both offshore and NAM manufacturers, as 
indicated by it recent creation of the "GEO" label to cover these vehicles. 
Nevertheless, at this point in time, it appears that GM's share of Big Three U.S. 
production is likely to be on the order of 45% in 1993, down from roughly 48% in 1988. That 
suggests that GM will build about 4.4 million of the 9.8 million traditional domestic light vehicles 
for our 1993 market, a decline in production level of some 800,000 cars and trucks from 1988, 
That is a decrease of some 15% in production volume, the equivalent of about 3.3 assembly plants. 
On the average, then, we would expect 1993 GM employment to fall some 15% from 1988 levels 
due to market factors and vehicle sourcing patterns. 
Preliminary analyses of 1989 sales data suggest that GM's sale of North American 
produced vehicles was almost 400,000 below its 1988 level. That is halfway to our 1993 
expectation, and the employment effects of that loss are being felt in the first quarter of 1990. GM 
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has temporarily idled or extended holiday shutdowns for the vast majority of its U.S. assembly 
plants, and reduced its planned first quarter build. 
Genesee has two final assembly facilities, Buick City and Truck and Bus Assembly. Buick 
City assembles the Buick LeSabre. LeSabre ranked second in the 1989 J.D. Powers Initial Quality 
Survey, and its sales increased some 4 8 ,  although the passenger car market fell abut 6%. 
However, these sales are not sufficient to fill a plant, and so Buick City also assembles the Olds 
88, adding the 4-door version from Wentzville, MO in 1989. Sales of this car fell some 13% from 
1988 to 1989. Overall, sales of Buick City's current production models fell nearly 5% in 1989, 
although they increased their share of GM cars to nearly 9%, and marginally improved to about 3% 
of the total car market. In any case, the demand (250,000 to 300,000, depending on the market) 
for these cars should be adequate to keep Buick City operating two shifts for the next few years. 
Truck and Bus Assembly will begin to assemble the GM full-size van. This vehicle lost 
about one-half a point of both GM and total market share from 1988 to 1989, as smaller vans 
continued to increase in popularity for the individual consumer market. However, commercial 
demand for full-size vans will continue, although the plant may require fewer employees as total 
demand falls. Full-size van production may also be partially shared with Canadian facilities adding 
additional caution. 
If both assembly plants in Genesee look relatively safe, the overall GM performance is of 
direct concern to GM supplier plants in Genesee. Genesee's assembly plants constitute only 10% 
or so of their GM demand, a demand that fell some 7% in 1989 as GM sales declined. 
Productivity Issues 
The U.S. industry today faces an increasingly complex competitive challenge, including 
traditional competition between companies within the industry and competition between the 
industry and its offshore competitors. The issue of industry competitiveness is tied to the overall 
competitiveness of the United States as a production location because much of the automotive 
industry's overall competitiveness depends on the strength of so many U.S. manufacturing and 
material supply industries. 
We asked our survey respondents to rate the importance of U.S. improvement in each of 
ten areas to its remaining a competitive production location. The breadth of the industry challenge 
is indicated by the relatively high importance respondents attribute to all of these performance 
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areas, displayed in Table 2.3. Eight of these performance areas are rated between 4.0 and 4.5 on 
our scale, anchored by 5.0 as "Very Important." 
Only two areas -- hourly (3.5) and salaried (3.4) labor cost -- fall below 4.0 on our scale, 
although they still fall to the more important side of the mid-point. Two major components of 
labor cost are the rates for wages and benefits and labor productivity. The weakening of the dollar 
against the currencies of most foreign automotive competitors has currently rendered wage and 
benefit rates competitively less important than they were in the first half of the decade. But 
currencies can and do shift in relative value, and there is no assurance that wage and benefit rates 
will not again become competitively important. Wage and benefit rates in North America are 
typically higher than those of emerging vehicle and parts producers, and that represents a specific 
competitive disadvantage, one that has historically been compensated by superior performance in 
other competitively significant areas. 
Table 2.3 
Estimated Importance of Improved 
U.S. Performance on Ten Competitive Dimensions 
The other eight performance dimensions included in our survey are all related, directly or 
indirectly, to productivity, and all fall between 4.0 and 4.5 on our scale. Roductivity is the other 
component of labor cost, and presents a continuing and permanent competitive challenge. 
Productivity, in its broadest sense, is the maximization of output in relation to input. It 
encompasses the efficient use of all resources, including financial capital, facilities, and equipment, 
as well as effective transactions with both suppliers and customers, in addition to the more 
traditionally recognized area of unit labor output at both the hourly and salaried levels of the 







Hourly Labor Productivity 
Capital Utilization 
Salaried Labor Productivity 
Hourly Labor Cost 












* On a scale with 1 = Not Very Important, 3 = Moderately 
Important, and 5 = Very Important. 
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Higher productivity offsets the lower wage and benefit rates of newly emerging producers in less 
developed economies, and that is the realistic basis of competition with them. Productivity is also 
an important basis of competition with developed producers, perhaps especially Japan. 
The relatively tight clustering of these eight items prohibits extensive discussion of the 
comparative emphasis suppliers place upon them. This clustering itself might reflect a number of 
different factors. It might be that the pattern of relative emphasis depends on the supplier's 
particular segment of the industry, or even the supplier's unique situation, and there are no clear 
"industry-wide" priorities. It might be that these areas are all quite important, and that simple fact 
overwhelms whatever distinctions there might be among them. Finally, it may be that productivity 
improvement is a "motherhood" issue, eliciting strong endorsement of any particular element or 
approach within its scope. 
The automotive industry has improved its labor productivity substantially since the early 
1980s. When output is constant, improved labor productivity is achieved through workforce 
reduction. This can occur smoothly, through workforce attrition due to voluntary separation, 
including retirement. However, companies often reduce their workforces through layoffs, shift 
terminations, and plant closings. Thus workforce reductions are often "lumpy," or concentrated, 
creating problems for communities, such as Genesee, with large concentrations of automotive 
employment as well as for the individuals that are directly affected. 
The automotive industry has improved its labor productivity in excess of 3% per year since 
the early 1950s. We think that the industry must continue to achieve that level, and even better it, 
if at all possible, if it is to remain competitive. However, this improved labor productivity will 
have little benefit unless the companies also achieve the broad cost reductions available from 
improved multi-factor productivity. Labor content is too small a share of total automotive cost for 
its improvement alone to provide the necessary competitive advantages that cost reductions confer. 
It is also more difficult to increase labor productivity as production decreases than when production 
increases. Nevertheless, we expect to see a minimum of 3% per year improved labor productivity, 
and that converts to an annual 3% decrease in jobs, assuming that output is constant. 
If the Big Three improve their labor productivity 3% per year between 1988 and 1993, then 
roughly 14% of Big Three jobs will be eliminated, assuming constant output. But we expect 10% 
of jobs to be lost due to production and market share declines. So the combined effects of market 
and productivity job losses suggest that some 22.6% (1 - [0.90 x 0.861) of industry jobs will be 
lost by 1993. 
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GM is reported to be behind both Chry sler and Ford in labor productivity, although some 
observers feel this is primarily due to its lower rates of capacity utilization. However, absent a 
surge in GM market share, its low rates of capacity utilization suggest more likely plant closings, 
so we expect to see GM pursue even larger productivity gains. If GM achieves a 4% annual 
improvement rate, then roughly 18.5% of GM jobs will be lost with a constant market. 
Combining this with our estimate of GM's production and market share yields a total GM job loss 
of 31% (1 - [0.85 x .815]). 
There is no evidence that suggests that Genesee's GM endowment differs from the overall 
corporation in productivity. Some of its plants are quite productive, some have improved rapidly, 
and some still face challenges. However, the high GM concentration in Genesee makes it likely 
that to suffer a "lumpy" loss -- that is, it is likely that one or more of its facilities will close as part 
of the corporation's downsizing, perhaps without regard to the plant's specific performance. 
Outsourcing. 
We asked our respondents to indicate how rapidly the manufacturers are moving to 
implement a variety of practices. These practices fom the foundation of the changes predicted for 
the structure of the American automotive industry, particularly for the relationship between 
suppliers and manufacturers. Table 2.4 displays these results. Continuous quality improvement 
(4.5 on a scale ranging from 1= slow to 5= rapid) is the most rapidly developing change, followed 
by reduction in the number of suppliers (3.8), continuous price pressure (3.7), and reliance on 
supplier engineering (3.6). 
There are two striking aspects to these results. First, the manufacturers' emphasis on 
quality improvement remains, in these supplier reports, the most rapidly developing change in 
standard business practices, as it has throughout the 1980s. This is important because some in the 
industry have been concerned that this emphasis might slacken somewhat with the relatively 
stronger sales and profit performance of the domestic Big Three over the past few years, fearing 
that the old habit of "pushing the iron out the door" would revive. Second, reduction in the 
number of suppliers shows the greatest increase in estimated implementation rate and relative 
ranking compared to earlier surveys. Reduction in the size of the supplier base, at least in direct 
suppliers to the manufacturers, seems to be occurring as the manufacturers introduce new models 
and platforms. 
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So the American supplier base is shrinking, and suppliers will have to improve their quality 
and increase their engineering conmbution to survive. This must be accomplished while facing 
Table 2.4 
Rate of Implementing Changes in 
Manufacturer-Supplier Practices 
continual pressure from their customers to reduce prices. These changes suggest an upgrading of 
Factor 
' Continuous Quality Improvement 
Reduced Number of Suppliers 
Continuous Price Reductions 
Supplier Engineering Contribution 
Sole Sourcing 
JIT 





the supply base is underway, and that, coupled with a reduction in the number of suppliers, 













The most slowly developing practice is the manufacturers' move to offshore or 
nondomestic sourcing. From 1982 until 1986 manufacturers sought, and traditional suppliers 
feared, major increases in nondomestic sourcing. Two events have seriously altered this 
expectation. First, the dollar weakened against the yen, mark, and other major currencies. That 
eliminated the cost advantage of many offshore suppliers. Second, the U.S. supplier base has 
significantly improved its quality level, and that undercuts the cost advantage of offshore sources, 
such as South Korea and Taiwan, where the currency shift has been much smaller. Our 
respondents report that increased non-U.S. sourcing is the most slowly developing change of the 
11 practices we listed, at 1.9 on our scale, 0.6 points below the next most slowly developing 
trend. Non-U.S. sourcing exhibits the largest decrease in estimated rate and comparative ranking 
of any of these practices that were included in earlier surveys. 
* On a scale with 1 = Slow, 3 = Moderate, and 5 = Rapid, 
- 
This decline in the growth of offshore sourcing is good news for communities such as 
Genesee. The manufacturers, and especially GM, had been expected to combine their increased 
outsourcing with moves to offshore sources. That is, many felt that it was particularly the allied or 
captive suppliers that were most at risk for losses to offshore sources. Currency changes have 
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made these competitors less attractive, and while that does not eliminate the outsourcing threat, it 
certainly decreases it. 
The independent supplier community has welcomed, while the UAW and many 
Midwestern communities such as Genesee have resisted, the manufacturers' announced intentions 
to outsource more work to independent suppliers. These suppliers see increased outsourcing as 
proceeding at somewhat less than a moderate rate of speed (2.5 on our scale). Manufacturer 
outsourcing has been restrained by the current UAW contract, but could accelerate after this year's 
negotiations. This might happen if an industry downturn leads to decreased production for the 
manufacturers' allied suppliers. Such work might be outsourced as the industry recovers. 
However, on balance it seems unlikely that rapid, major changes in the allocation of work between 
the manufacturers and their suppliers will occur over the next five years6 To be sure, there will be 
product-specific threats and opportunities for allied and independent suppliers, as the 
manufacturers alter their specific make-buy decisions. But it is difficult to envision the substantial 
net increases in purchases that would accompany the significant decreases in manufacturer levels of 
vertical integration that analysts expected just a few years ago. 
Analysts have expected two other related changes in the structure of the U.S. industry: an 
increase in the tiering of the supply base, and a move to more modular, or system, sourcing. 
Tiering involves a more unidirectional flow of goods through the levels of the supply base to the 
manufacturers. This is often represented as a pyramid shaped industry, with parts and components 
flowing upwards from material suppliers through partJcomponent suppliers to the manufacturers at 
the apex. This structure is attractive to the manufacturers for a number of reasons, and many 
expected that it would come about as the manufacturers reduced their numbers of direct suppliers, 
and moved to sourcing more built-up components, and even complete systems. While the 
reduction in suppliers appears to be moving along somewhat rapidly (3.8), neither tiering (2.9) nor 
modular sourcing (2.5) are developing nearly as rapidly. 
However, there are reasons to believe that both tiering and modular sourcing may accelerate 
in the future. The manufacturers find them quite attractive, since they both reduce the 
manufacturers' transaction costs. Tiering is an integral part of our image of the Japanese industry, 
and thus has a certain appeal to the manufacturers as they attempt to adopt elements of the Japanese 
industry structure. Modular sourcing will, in many cases, reduce the manufacturers' own labor 
6 
This repnsmts a change in our own apcctatims. In our previws Report we relied on much a m g a  e ~ o m  as to the increased levels of 
outsoludng. 
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cost, as the suppliers take on subassembly work that is typically accomplished in the vehicle 
assembly plant. Both these developments may exhibit a long, slow start-up period, followed by a 
period of rapid acceleration. Modular sourcing, for example, may be introduced in a more 
clustered than smooth fashion, as the manufacturers make major moves associated with new model 
or platform introductions. It is possible that we will see modular sourcing follow the pattern that 
appears to have developed with reduction in the number of direct suppliers: generally slow 
development with concentrated periods of rapid implementation. 
If the Big Three increase their level of outsourcing by about 1% per year from now until 
1993, then their level of vertical integration will fall from just under 45% to just under 42%, 
implying a loss of about 6% of Big Three jobs. When we combine these with losses to production 
decreases and productivity improvement, we see a net loss of some 27% (1 - [0.90 x 0.86 x 
0.941). 
Unfortunately for Genesee, GM also has the highest level of vertical integration among the 
domestic manufacturers, typically reported at about 50%, and is the company that placed the 
greatest emphasis on decreased vertical integration as a competitive strategy. However, we believe 
that GM has also decreased its emphasis on this particular strategy. Nevertheless, we think it is 
likely that GM will increase outsourcing somewhat more than Ford and Chrysler, perhaps on the 
order of 1.5% per year from now until 1993. That would lower GM's vertical integration to about 
46% and put GM job loss due to outsourcing at about 8%. Combining all three factors suggests 
that GM job losses by 1993 may well be on the order of 36% (1 - [0.85% x 0.815 x 0.92). 
The pattern of GM outsourcing that develops has important implications for Genesee. If 
GM carefully selects components and parts that do not rationally fit in its operations, then the 
losses may strengthen the remaining GM base. However, if GM seeks to divest itself of 
operations that have high labor content to avoid UAW labor rates, then the survival benefit 
provided remaining operations will be lower. This strategic choice will influence which plants are 
affected by outsourcing. 
Will Genesee see a 36% decline in GM employment by 1993? These estimates are in the 
nature of "worst case" from an employment perspective. GM has resources that, properly 
deployed, should be capable of reversing its market slide. Such a reversal might capture sufficient 
production to cover reductions necessary for productivity improvement. It may be that rational 
restructuring will turn out to require less outsourcing than many experts believe, and that most 
expect. GM may decide that it makes sense to reconcentrate its production activities in its current 
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base area, so that Genesee suffers proportionately lower losses. But even a somewhat more 
optimistic scenario suggests GM employment losses by the mid-1990s are likely to be on the order 
of 20% to 25%, and Genesee will probably experience close to that level of job loss from its 
current automotive economy. 
The U.S. Supplier Industry 
Since GM, and thus Genesee, faces a continued likely erosion of jobs, it is reasonable for 
Genesee to seek to decrease its dependency on GM for jobs. While the ideal diversification 
strategy for Genesee calls for decreased dependence on the automotive industry in general, a near- 
term strategy of diversification of that automotive dependency away from GM also makes sense. 
After all, the workforce and infrastructure Genesee might offer a new employer are currently best 
suited to automotive production. But Ford and especially Chrysler are unlikely to add significant 
capacity in the next five years, and, in any case, each would probably resist locating in a region 
with such a high level of GM concentration. That still leaves the possibility that independent 
suppliers might locate facilities in Genesee, even though that, too, appears to be somewhat 
unlikely, for reasons that are detailed in our prior Report. This section provides some general 
information on that independent automotive supplier community. 
The 92 respondents to our 198811989 supplier survey represent a fair cross section of the 
traditional American supplier industry in terms of products, geographic distribution, employment, 
and sales. Their locations range from Connecticut to California, but the majority are located in 
Michigan (34) and Ohio (16). The Frostbelt continues to be the heartland of the automotive 
supplier industry. Supplier size, measured by number of employees, covers a wide range: from 40 
employees to 115,000. Four companies (4%) have fewer than 20 employees, 23 (25%) between 
40 and 225, 15 (16%) between 250 and 450, and 50 (54%) have 500 or more employees. Our 
respondents, then, are probably somewhat skewed to larger suppliers. But these larger suppliers 
form an appropriate target group for economic development. First, they comprise a more limited, 
and therefore more targeted group. Second, information about them is more readily available and 
retrievable. Third, their sales are less concentrated in the automotive sector, and thus provide more 
intermediate diversification for Genesee. Fourth, they are probably more likely to consider adding 
production facilities beyond their current geographical base than would smaller suppliers. 
Twenty-four (26%) report sales below $20,000,000 in 1987, 38 (41%) between 
$20,000,000 and $100,000,000, and 30 (33%) had sales greater than $100,000,000. While 
domestic automotive vehicle production decreased from 1986 to 1987, 91% of our respondents 
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enjoyed a sales increase from 1986 to 1987. We suspect this reflects three developments. First, 
the manufacturers probably increased their level of outsourcing, purchasing production goods and 
services, such as parts, components, and engineering, rather than supplying them in-house. 
Second, some reduction in the ranks of automotive suppliers occmed, making more business 
available to survivors. Third, some of these companies undoubtedly increased their nonautomotive 
sales as they pursued diversification strategies. 
These suppliers are dependent on the auto industry, averaging about 58% of their sales to 
the manufacturers and another 20% to other suppliers. One-third of our respondents placed no less 
than 85% of their dollar sales with the automotive manufacturers, while 70% secured at least 50% 
of their sales from the manufacturers. While many suppliers emphasize their plans for 
diversification away from the automotive industry, these data are not substantially different from 
earlier surveys. Their import-export activity is typical of the industry, sourcing roughly 15% of 
their production materials and goods offshore, and exporting about 6% of their sales. Only six of 
these companies report exporting more than 15% of their sales. 
We asked respondents to report up to three major products they supply the manufacturers 
and up to three they provide other suppliers. The 88 companies that responded to this item supply 
at least 326 parts and components to manufacturers and other suppliers for eventual on-board use 
in light vehicle production. Table 2.5 displays their major product categories. These cover a wide 
range of parts and components for a variety of systems and subsystems, including: seats (20%); 
body (17%); brake, wheel, and tire (10%); engine (7%); transmission (7%); steering (6%); and 
chassis (6%). The balance of their part and component production is divided between products not 
covered in our coding protocol (17%) and the four remaining categories ( ~ W O )  of that protocol. 7 
The majority (58%) of these products are marketed directly to the manufacturers. Eighty- 
eight respondents provided product information, and 87 of those companies market to the 
manufacturers. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, most suppliers provide more than one product or 
product family to the manufacturers. Only 32% specialize in one product or family, while 48% 
supply at least three, and possibly more, products to the manufacturers. 
But 42% of these products are marketed between suppliers, and that suggests the complex 
marketing arrangements characteristic of the North American automotive industry. It also means 
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that suppliers may be somew hat less dependant on particular manufacturers than their distribution 
of direct sales might indicate, since the "supplier" customers may have a very different distribution 
of manufacturer customers than their own. The suppliers marketing of products, then, breaks out 
about 3:2 between manufacturing customers and other supplier customers. On the other hand, we 
report above that supplier dollar sales break out about 3:l between manufacturers and suppliers. 
We suspect that this reflects two aspects of the industry: first, sales to manufacturers typically are 
farther along the value-added chain of industry production; and second, the volumes represented 
by manufacturer sales are considerably higher than those represented by sales to other suppliers. 
This suggests that the rationalization of the industry, at least in terms of a reduced supplier base, is 
more developed at the supplier-manufacturer interface than it is within the supplier base itself. 
Figure 2.3 displays the suppliers' patterns of providing products to other suppliers. Seventy-three 
of our respondents (83% of those providing product information) supply products to other 
suppliers, including one with no manufacturers as customers. Seventeen percent, then, supply 
only the manufacturers, while another 38% supply one product, 17% two products, and 28% three 
(or more) products to other suppliers. The pattern of providing products to other suppliers is 
somewhat different from the pattern of supplying the manufacturers: 48% supply three or more 
products to the manufacturers, but only 28% supply three or more products to other suppliers. 
Table 2.5 
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Figure 2.2: Number of Products Supplied to Manufacturers, 
by Percent of Suppliers 
NoRoducts I TwoRoducts 
One Product a llmeor MaeProducts 
Figure 2.3: Number of Products Supplied to Other Suppliers, 
by Percent of Suppliers 
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Summary 
The traditional domestic automotive industry continues to face a growing threat of 
international competition. The current major dimensions of this threat are the increased production 
presence of the Japanese NAM's in North America and the shift into the intermediate and, 
especially, the luxury segment of the car market, of Japanese imports. We also expect to see more 
serious competition in the light truck segment from a number of the Japanese manufacturers. 
We expect the 1993 market to grow some 4.5% compared to 1988, but the domestic 
production of the Big Three to fall some 1.1 million light vehicles, the annual output of more than 
four assembly plants. This suggests job losses of about 10% from the 1988 base. If the Big 
Three improve their productivity 3% per year, this will result in the loss of some 14% of jobs at a 
constant production level. The industry is likely to increase its level of outsourcing about 1% per 
year, accounting for another 8% job decrease. These outsourcing estimates are substantially 
reduced from just a few years ago, and the business made available much less likely to go 
offshore. When we combine these estimates, Big Three employment losses by 1993 may well 
reach 27% of the 1988 workforce. 
GM is the domestic manufacturer of overwhelming importance to Genesee County, and we 
expect to see it continue to experience erosion in its domestic market share and production volume. 
GM's 1993 domestic production of cars and trucks may fall to 85% of its 1988 level. 
Unfortunately, we also expect GM jobs to be more at risk due to greater productivity improvement 
(4% per year) and a somewhat higher increase in outsourcing (1.5% per year). This results in a 
combined potential job loss at GM of some 36% of its 1988 workfo~e. More optimistic scenarios 
still put job loss in the 20% to 25% range by the mid-1990s, and there is little reason to expect 
Genesee's experience to differ markedly from the total GM experience. 
Although Genesee faces some realistic problems in attracting independent suppliers, that 
industry represents a logical near-tern target for economic development. That industry is 
competitively stronger now than just a few years ago, and many of its constituent companies are 
healthy, and some will be seeking new production capacity. 
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Introduction 
The previous chapter suggests that the traditional Big Three, and perhaps especially GM, 
face a continuing and serious competitive challenge from NAM's and imports. We expect to see 
some further erosion in their domestic production, and that implies less business for their 
suppliers, both independent and allied, and fewer jobs in the industry. Nevertheless, we remain 
persuaded that diversification within the automotive sector is a sensible strategy for Genesee 
County. 
This chapter describes the overcapacity situation facing the traditional industry and presents 
information as to how it is likely to impact both independent and allied suppliers. It presents some 
recent data on supplier views of the competitiveness of the United States and the Frostbelt, supplier 
selection criteria for the Big Three, and supplier site selection criteria. Finally, it provides some 
identification of product areas that may be capacity constrained in spite of industry overcapacity. 
Overcapacity 
Our market projections suggest that there is little question that the traditional American 
automotive industry faces a serious issue of overcapacity as we move into the 1990s. Typical 
estimates of manufacturer overcapacity by 199211993 are on the order of 30%. That is, there will 
be as much as 130% of required Big Three capacity targeted on the North American automotive 
market by that time. But the internationalization of sourcing changes the patterns of supplier 
capacity as well, although not necessarily in exact parallel with manufacturer capacity. Supplier 
overcapacity is an important context for supplier decisions to expand or to add capacity, and thus 
important information for those seeking new supplier facilities or the strengthening of an existing 
base. 
Before we turn to supplier capacity issues, we provide some estimates of manufacturer 
overcapacity. Table 3.1 displays our straight-time North American capacity estimates for the 
traditional domestic manufacturers. These estimates, combined with our market estimates in Table 
2.2 of Chapter 2, suggest an overcapacity of about 36% (8.015.9 million) in cars and 23% (4.813.9 
Chapter 3: Capacity and Competition 
million) in light trucks, for a total straight-time overcapacity of over 3 1 % (12.819.8 million). This 
is in line with most published estimates. However, ow estimates compare North American 
capacity to the U.S. market. If we include the Canadian market, overcapacity falls to about 20% in 
cars (8.016.7 million) and just under 10% (4.814.4 million) in trucks. This suggests a total North 
American light duty vehicle overcapacity of just over 16% (12.811 1.0 million) for the traditional 
North American manufacturers. 1 
Table 3.1 
Traditional North American 
1993 Estimated Capacity 
(millions of vehicles) 
GM's capacity in 1993 will be about seven million light vehicles, ignoring the probable 
closing of about four assembly plants. We project GM's North American build at roughly 4.4 
million light vehicles for the U.S. market, or about 5.0 million for the U.S. and Canada. That 
results in an estimated GM overcapacity of some 40%, and implies that capacity at Ford and 
Chrysler will just about match remaining sales available to the traditional manufacturers. Indeed, 
most analysts agree that it is likely to be GM that holds the lion's share of excess capacity. 
We think that the NAM's are likely to sell about 1.7 million cars in the United States, and 
an additional 10% in the Canadian market. We also think they are likely to export roughly 100,000 
cars to Europe and another 90,000 to 130,000 to Japan, primarily because of trade friction between 
Japan and both the United States and Europe. That suggests total NAM car build somewhat over 2 
million vehicles, and about 99% straight-time capacity utilization. However, we forecast about 
460,000 NAM truck sales and capacity for about 690,000, or overcapacity of some 50% in NAM 
trucks. Total overcapacity for the NAM's will be just under 9%. This level of "overcapacity" may 
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Thus we see NAM overcapacity (9%) at about one-half the level of the traditional manufacturer 
(16%), but the patterns by type of vehicle also differ substantially. Traditional manufacturers are 
likely to experience proportionately greater overcapacity in cars, while NAM's are likely to face 
more overcapacity in light trucks. To be sure, if Toyota does not establish a truck plant, then 
NAM trucks, even at reduced sales levels, are likely to come closer to their reduced straight-time 
capacity. 
lier We asked our survey respondents to estimate the proportion of their 
199211993 customers' requirements that could be met by various types of suppliers. The types of 
suppliers include the 1) the allied divisions of the vehicle manufacturers; 2) the traditional 
independent American supplier base; 3) traditional suppliers that move into product areas that are 
2 new for them; 4) New American Suppliers, or NAS's; and 5) offshore or nondomestic suppliers. 
We asked for these estimates for two categories of manufacturers: their traditional Big Three 
customers and the New American Manufacturers, or NAM's. The fact that there are now two 
distinct types of manufacturers emphasizes the increasingly international and multinational nature 
of automotive manufacture, 
It is important to bear in mind that GM allied suppliers constitute the vast majority of 
Genesee's current automotive endowment. From that perspective, other types of suppliers often 
constitute Genesee's competition. Nevertheless, two other types of suppliers represent possible 
additions to the Genesee endowment, and thus targets of opportunity for community economic 
development: the traditional independent supplier, and, perhaps to a somewhat lower degree, the 
NAS's. 
Figure 3.1 displays the responses to these questions. Suppliers report that these various 
sources can meet 153% of their traditional customers' needs, while they can meet 190% of the 
NAM's' needs. That suggests that overcapacity at the supplier level may indeed be even more 
serious than that predicted at the manufacturer level. These levels of overcapacity indicate the 
probable development of even more fierce competition at the supplier level than the already heated 
competition of the past few years. 
To be sure, we cannot determine whether or not these supplier projections are accurate. 
But we can ask whether they are consistent with other projections and assumptions, at least for 
their traditional customers. Suppliers estimate that the allied and traditional independent suppliers 
L 
Most of there suppliers m U.S. production sites of Japanese suppliers, 8uch rr Ogihua'r Howell, htichigan f a d t y .  
3 
New American Manufacturer Supply (Total: 190%) 
I Big 'lhhe AUkd 
Tnditimd U.S. Supplier 
1 Tmditional, New Entnnt 
New A m e h  Supplier 
a Nm-U.S. 
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Traditional Manufacturer Supply (Total: 153%) 
Figure 3.1: Avallable Sup lier Capacity, rs a Percent of 
19924993 ~wtoiner Demand, by Source 
combined can meet 108% of their traditional customers' 199211993 demand. This is below the 
typically estimated 130% of vehicle overcapacity and our somewhat lower estimate of 116%. 
However, supplier overcapacity is influenced by factors in addition to vehicle demand, and they do 
not all predict excess capacity. 
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First, suppliers report that reduction in the number of suppliers is moving rapidly. If we 
assume that some 10% of the supply base, and corresponding capacity, is eliminated by 
199211993, that leaves 90% of today's suppliers pursuing business by then. That would raise the 
estimate of 108% to 120% (108%/90%), and therefore within the range of our own and 
conventional expectations. Second, outsourcing may provide some small increase in business, an 
increase that will probably not be completely offset by increases in nondomestic sourcing. To be 
sure, the net additional supplier business from these changes in sourcing patterns will likely be 
small, but it will provide some additional demand for surviving suppliers, thus restraining 
overcapacity. 3 
Suppliers view the two types of manufacturers as having quite different patterns of 
potential supplier capacity. The NAS's and nondomestic suppliers are viewed as potentially 
providing greater capacity to the NAM's than to the domestics (44% vs. 16% and 43% vs. 17%, 
respectively). We assume that most offshore sourcing for the NAM's will be from Japan, 
reflecting current practices, while there will probably be a continued shift of the domestic 
manufacturers' offshore sourcing to countries like Taiwan, South Korea, and Mexico, where 
currency values have not increased as much as Japan's. 
How will this overcapacity affect different types of suppliers? If we assume that each type 
of supplier secures business proportional to its available capacity for each type of manufacturer, 
then Figure 3.2 displays the break-out of 199211993 manufacturer sourcing. But how likely is that 
business to be spread evenly across supplier bases? We cannot be certain, of course, but our 
estimate is that it will not be evenly allocated to all suppliers. 
. . 
radi-e Sourc- The traditional manufacturers will undoubtedly re- 
source some of their demand to the NAS's, although this may be limited by purchasing policies. 
These suppliers have a number of significant competitive advantages, including their general 
reputation for high quality, the typically lower costs associated with a greenfield site (especially 
those afforded substantial public subsidies), and a younger labor force. Of course, it is unclear 
exactly what proportion of total traditional demand will be met by the NAS's, but most analysts 
assume that it will be at least the 10% proportional allocation, and probably closer to the 16% of 
demand they are estimated to be capable of meeting. This could change dramatically if the 
traditional manufacturers begin to view sourcing from the NAS's as increasing the competitiveness 
of competitor vehicle manufacturers. 
3 
A latter seaion of the report presents supplier estimates of the mpidity of changes in these md other industry business practices. 
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New American Manufacturer 
Figure 3.2: 
I Big Three Allied 
Traditional U.S. Supplier 
I Traditional, New Entrant 
H New American Supplier 
Non-U.S. 
Traditional Mnnufactum Supply (Total: 153%) 
'1993 Manufacturing Sourcing 
Allocated Proportionally To Av 
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Offshore sourcing by the domestics would be on the order of 11% (17%/153%), assuming 
available manufacturer business is spread proportionately across different supplier bases. But it is 
possible that nondomestic suppliers will receive less than a proportional share, perhaps only on the 
order of 5% to 7%. This would be more in line with the supplier expectations for slow 
development of offshore sourcing discussed in Chapter Two. There are three reasons for this 
expectations. First, we think that traditional suppliers will compete fiercely to retain business, and 
many of them will compete on a variable cost basis rather than reduce capacity. Second, we think 
the early 1990s will see the NAS's making access to the traditional domestic industry their number 
one strategic priority. 
Third, the strengthening of the yen has somewhat lessened the formidable competitive 
challenge of Japanese suppliers, and this challenge will not automatically be replaced by other 
offshore sources. The Japanese are no longer simultaneously the lowcost and high-quality source 
for many automotive goods. To be sure, the strengthened yen has not damaged their quality, and 
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there is evidence that they are capable of restraining their costs in the face of a strong yen. But 
now they must frequently face competitors that can best them on a cost basis, if not a quality basis. 
Moreover, we think that the domestic manufacturers will likely restrain their sourcing from 
Japanese companies to avoid increasing their dependency on their major competitor industry. 
Ford, for example, has already indicated that it will limit its sourcing from Japanese suppliers to 
cases where they have clear technological advantages. 
CAFE regulations, on the other hand, may result in increased offshore sourcing for large 
vehicles that are made by traditional domestic manufacturers. The Big Three face the problem of 
how to structure their domestic and import CAFE fleets so as to avoid penalties. CAFE requires a 
particular calculation of domestic content, with vehicles at or above 75% considered "domestic" 
and those below 75% treated as "imports", regardless of where they are assembled. Domestic and 
import vehicles are separately evaluated for conformance to CAFE, and the fleets are therefore 
subject to separate penalties for noncompliance. 
For the domestics, meeting CAFE standards for the domestic fleet may require moving 
some large vehicles into the import fleet, and that can be done by lowering the level of domestic 
content below 75%. These larger vehicles could then be offset by more fuel efficient imports, and 
they would not reduce the CAFE performance of other domestic vehicles. That strategy would 
require lowering the typically high current levels of domestically manufactured content, often 
reported to be in the 90%s, down to a level of at most 60%. 4 
If the manufacturers decide to lower the domestic content of some vehicles, how they elect 
to do so is critical for suppliers. If they choose to source offshore major powertrain elements, 
such as engines or transmissions, then their domestic allied supplier divisions may be hit hard. 
Genesee has two GM engine facilities serving intermediate and larger cars, and Buick City has 
some Hydra-Matic capacity; these plants could conceivably lose some work if GM follows a major 
component "de-contenting" strategy. 
But such a strategy might pennit current independent American suppliers to retain much of 
their present business. An engine sourced from Mexico, for example, is 100% import content, 
even if 50% of its value is composed of American exports to Mexico. If, on the other hand, the 
manufacturers elect to source many lower-value parts and components offshore, then independent 
4 
In fact, it might be quite a bit lower than 60%. That is because these vehicles typically have a higher portion of inherently domestic conlent 
[profit and madcuing expenses, for example], that must be offset by lowa levela of domatic amtent in the tourcuble portion of the vehicle. 
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suppliers may face a more broadly dispersed threat, and one more difficult to meet through 
increased export activity. In any case, suppliers may find that protecting their current levels of 
business requires substantial change in their current business practices and customer base. 
Unfortunately for Genesee, if GM decides to "de-content" its large cars, it will probably 
elect to source major components offshore. This would be more efficient in terms of logistics, 
source selection, and quality control. In addition, GM has engine and transmission facilities in 
Mexico that could probably supply the required volumes relatively rapidly. 
If the Big Three lower the domestic content levels of larger vehicles to meet CAFE 
standards, then offshore suppliers might well secure the 11 % of available Big Three demand that 
reflects the proportional allocation of demand to available capacity. But how much of this offshore 
content consists of American exports will probably depend on the specific strategy the 
manufacturers pursue in attaining lowered levels of domestic content 
NAM So- We see the NAM's seriously pursuing a high level of domestic content by 
199211993. There are three primary motivations for this. First, there will be continued concern 
about the bilateral automotive trade balance. High domestic content will ease trade fiction between 
the United States and Japan, both through its real impact on the deficit, and its symbolic value as 
evidence of good faith effort. Second, there are clear advantages to proximate sourcing, especially 
in the low inventory, pull manufacturing systems characteristic of the Japanese manufacturers. 
Third, we feel that the Japanese will want their U.S. production clearly viewed as "American" so 
that it provides a possible source of vehicles for the European market, should "Europe 1992" bring 
with it restrictions on import vehicles from Japan. 
At the same time, CAFE standards may establish an upper limit on the domestic content 
levels of the NAM's. The Japanese certainly appear to be making a concerted effort to upscale 
their vehicle offerings, and most of these larger and more expensive vehicles will come from 
Japan. This allows the Japanese industry to reduce the unit level of vehicle exports to the United 
States without necessarily reducing the value of those exports. The Japanese industry can then 
argue that they have reduced imports in units, and that U.S. consumer choice is responsible for the 
continued high levels of the trade deficit in dollars. But it is entirely conceivable that these upscale 
imports will have trouble meeting the CAFE standards that may be in force by 199211993. Now, 
in the Winter of 198911990, discussions indicate a serious possibility of CAFE miles-per-gallon 
standards in the low 30s by 199211993. To guard against this, we think the Japanese 
manufacturers will want to keep their NAM vehicles as "imports" for CAFE purposes, so that 
Chapter 3: Capacity and Competition 
these more fuel efficient subcompacts (68% of projected NAM capacity) and compacts (32%) can 
be used to offset their less fuel efficient, upscale imports Erom Japan. 
These contrasting pressures suggest to us that the NAM's will seriously target a level of 
domestic content just below 75%, to maintain their "import" CAFE status, while securing as much 
of an "American" image as possible. However, the CAFE domestic content calculation includes 
inherently domestic, nonsourced content of just over 37% for the typical NAM vehiclee5 This 
portion of the vehicle is entirely domestic content in CAFE terms. That means the balance -- or 
"sourceable" content -- is just below 63% of the vehicle value. That portion of the vehicle 
represents supplier purchases, and it must be just under 60% domestic content for the vehicle's 
total calculated CAFE domestic content to be just under 75%. 
For the NAM's, then, offshore suppliers are likely to secure just over 40% of the estimated 
43% of NAM demand that they can fill. But that leaves the other four types of suppliers targeting a 
total 149% of capacity on 60% of the vehicle's sourceable content, or capacity at more than twice 
available demand. If the NAM's take the estimated available capacity of the NAS's (44%), as 
seems probable, that leaves the three types of traditional domestic suppliers with 105% of capacity 
to fill 16% of the originally estimated demand, or capacity that is some 650% of demand. If the 
NAM's equally split their domestic demand between NAS's and traditional suppliers, including all 
three categories, then the traditional suppliers will secure about 30% of NAM demand, but still face 
serious overcapacity, with 35W0 (105%/30%) of required capacity. On the other hand, NAS's will 
also secure about 30% of NAM demand, but that represents about 68% of their available capacity. 
Table 3.2 summarizes these possibilities. 
Moreover, the NAM's' likely heavy reliance on NAS's will deprive these traditional 
suppliers of another important source of business: each other. These suppliers relied on other 
suppliers for some 20% of their 1987 sales. But NAS's are almost certain to source from offshore 
at a fairly high rate, perhaps as much as 50%. To be sure, traditional suppliers also source 
offshore, but at a rate of about 15%, based on these data. So traditional suppliers may lose an 
additional 41% (1.0 - [.5/,85]) of the business between suppliers generated by NAM 
manufacturing when that business goes to NAS's. 
We suspect that the allied suppliers of the domestic manufacturers will experience special 
difficulty securing work from the NAM's. The NAM's are likely to source from allied suppliers 
5 
This content indudes assembly, mmufauuring pmfit, markaing expcnscr, and so f h .  
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Table 3.2 
Possible New American Manufacturing Demand, 
by Supplier Type 
Capacity Most Best 
Supplier Type Available Likely Case 
Big Three Allied 
Traditional I 105% 16% 30% Traditional, New Product 
New American 44% 44% 30% 
Supplier 
Non-U.S. Supplier 43% 40% 40% 
only in those cases where they in fact have unique technology, or an extreme competitive edge in 
quality and/or cost. A minor, or even moderate, edge will probably not suffice to win the business. 
We think the NAM's will view such sourcing as potentially helpful to a competitor, and will 
therefore resist it. The major exception to this will be in situations where the traditional 
manufacturer sources vehicles from the NAM or has an investment position in it. We suspect that 
they will be able to negotiate access for some of their allied suppliers in those circumstances. This 
suggests that GM allied suppliers in Genesee are unlikely to secure significant business from 
Toyota in Georgetown, KY, but may fare somewhat better in supplying Toyota vehicles made at 
NUMMI in Fremont, CA. 
Traditional suppliers, then, face a serious challenge. Their traditional customers are likely 
to provide decreased demand, and the ready replacement sources for this lost business, the 
NAM's, are not likely to come close to taking the suppliers' available capacity. Allied suppliers are 
particularly likely to find the NAM's inadequate replacements for their traditional business. 
Summarv. Overcapacity in the U.S. industry, then, will make entry into the traditional domestic 
industry more difficult for offshore suppliers. The competition between allied, traditional 
independent, NAS, and established offshore suppliers may effectively neutralize any cost 
advantage they might possess. This might preclude a typical entry strategy of quoting low prices to 
secure access and the opportunity to demonstrate competence. Overcapacity also suggests that 
domestic suppliers will be quite cautious about adding new facilities or expanding current ones. 
That is unfortunate news for communities such as Genesee that seek to acquire or expand an 
automotive supplier base as a component of their economic development activities. 
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CAFE regulations are likely to have the unintended effect of making it more difficult for the 
traditional U. S. supplier base of allied and independent suppliers to secure significant volumes of 
business at the NAM's. For the NAM's to meet the strategic needs of the Japanese manufacturers, 
it is likely that no more than 16% to 30% of their demand can be available to the traditional 
automotive supplier industry. 
Capacity Constraint. 
Of course, general levels of overcapacity conceal product areas that may in fact experience 
some capacity strain. Even in an overcapacity situation, some products are likely to face 
constraints, sometimes because they are new or face explosive demand, sometimes because of the 
decisions of current suppliers to leave a product area. 
We asked our respondents to identify as many as three specific product areas where current 
capacity may not be enough to meet 1992/1993 demand. If all 92 respondents identified three 
products, there would be 276 nominations. In fact, only 16 respondents identified such 
opportunities, and they indicated 26 product areas that might experience strained capacity. This is 
just under 10% of the possible nominations, and reinforces the overcapacity estimates discussed 
above. But it still suggests there are likely to be specific product areas that experience 
undercapacity. Products for seats (6 nominations), vehicle bodies (4 nominations), and fuel 
systems (3 nominations) lead this list. 
Capacity Plans. 
We asked respondents about their current capacity and future capacity plans for ten 
different non-U.S. production locations and three U.S. regions: the Frostbelt, the Midsouth, and 
elsewhere. Genesee is, of course, a Frostbelt community. These companies, as displayed in Table 
3.3, currently have at least one production location in all of these areas except Eastern Europe. The 
three U.S. locations total 131, or 58.5%, of the identified locations, followed by Canada at 
13.4%, Western Europe at 8.0%, and Mexico at 7.6%. 
We asked the likelihood that respondents' companies would add, replace, or reduce 
capacity in each of the thirteen locations. The scale covers 1= "near zero likelihood," through 3= 
"50150," to 5= "near loo%." The three U.S. locations have the highest summed scale scores for 
adding capacity, with the Frostbelt averaging 3.3, other U.S. at 3.1, and the Midsouth at 2.9. 
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Western Europe and Canada follow at 2.6 and 2.3, respectively. The highest score for capacity 
reductions are the ~rostbelt (1.9), Canada (1.7), and other U.S. and Brazil (1.5). 
Table 3.3 
Supplier Production Locations 
The Frostbelt (2.4), the Midsouth and Canada (lag), other U.S. (1.6) and Western Europe 
(1.3) are the only regions above 1.1 on our scale for replacing capacity, even though our question 
asked for retrofit or greenfield replacement. Unfortunately, the data patterns suggest that 
respondents may have interpreted the replacement question in a number of ways, including 1) 
replacing in that location capacity already existing in that location; 2) replacing in that location 
capacity currently existing in other locations; or 3) replacing in other locations capacity currently in 
that location. Therefore, until additional analysis clarifies this item, we discuss it no further. 
The probabilities of adding capacity clearly exceed those for reducing it. Does this mean 
that the supplier industry will indeed face increased future capacity, even above today's level, and 
that much of the nondomestic capacity targeted on the U.S. manufacturers may be owned by North 
American companies? We suspect that each of these respondents assumes that the capacity they 
add will be compensated by the reduction of competitors' capacity, and thus there will be little or 
no net added capacity. But if many companies pursue this strategy, there will inevitably be 
additional overcapacity and the eventual premature retirement of some companies' capital 
investments. Worldwide automotive growth is not likely to support the additional supplier capacity 
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fill their capacity. That competitive success will inevitably be at the expense of other companies, 
with some facing idle capacity, and others forced to retire capacity. In any case, the general 
situation of overcapacity will not discourage some of these companies from adding capacity even 
where sufficient capacity exists on an industry-wide basis. 
We converted these scale scores to probabilities, then multiplied them by the number of 
respondents to the item, to yield an expected value for each of these capacity decisionse6 The 
results for adding and reducing capacity are also displayed in Table 3.3. The three U.S. regions, 
Western Europe, Canada, and Mexico are likely to see the largest number of additional sites, while 
the Frostbelt, Canada, and the "other" U.S. location are likely to see the largest numerical 
reductions. 
We subtract the expected values for capacity reduction from the expected values for 
additional capacity to arrive at a net expected value for each region's additional production 
locations, displayed in Table 3.4. The three U.S. regions, Western Europe, and Mexico are likely 
to experience the largest absolute net gains. It merits comment that the Frostbelt, for all the adverse 
comment it receives in the popular and industry media, shows the largest absolute net gain in likely 
supplier locations, some 27% ahead of the second place Midsouth. These data also suggest that in 
many cases, the site location decision for a particular plant will focus on the selection of a region 
within the United States. 
The Frostbelt, Midsouth, and other U.S. regions will receive some 53% of the expected net 
location gains, although this is somewhat below their share of current locations. Canada suffers 
the largest share loss, from just over 13% of current to just under 7% of expected net additions, 
followed by the Frostbelt, falling from about 28% of current to about 22% of additions. Western 
Europe gains about 4%, moving from 8% of current to just under 12% of expected additions, with 
South Korea and Mexico gaining about 3% share of additions compared to their current share. 
6 
We treat uch decision as equivalent to one p h t ,  rlrhough that is lmdaubtedly an error in cenrin caaer because m e  canpanics will be 
considering more than am plant for a location as they respond to this question. 
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It is not surprising that the traditional heartlands of North American automotive production, 
the Frostbelt and Canada, take less of a share of expected future locations than they enjoyed in the 
past. Nor is it surprising that these losses, for the most part, are expected to be distributed 
throughout these other regions rather than concentrated in just one or two. However, it is 
somewhat surprising to see Western Europe doing so well in expected net gains. As an established 
region for these supplier companies' production, one might expect it to lose share to newly 
emerging regions, as is the case with the U. S. regions and Canada. We suspect that this reflects 
North American companies' considering European locations in light of the announced plans for a 
European free trade area after 1992. One strategic response to this situation is to establish new 
European production sites, to guard against restricted access to post-1992 Europe. 
Table 3.4 
Supplier Net Capacity Additions, by Region 
Table 3.4 also displays the rate of net gain for each of these regions, using their existing 
locations as a base. The low rates for the Frostbelt and Canada reflect their large existing base, 
while some high rates, such as China's, reflect a small existing base. Perhaps most noteworthy 
here is the continued growth of the Midsouth and other U.S. locations, perhaps at the expense of 
the Frostbelt and Canada. 
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Summary. There is no question that the traditional North American domestic automotive industry 
faces a serious threat of overcapacity as it enters the early years of the 1990's. To be sure, typical 
estimates of vehicle overcapacity of 130% are higher than our own estimates of some 116%, and 
the domestic industry's overcapacity may be more concentrated in cars than in light trucks. But it 
is serious overcapacity in any case. Suppliers, too, face overcapacity, perhaps even beyond that 
experienced by their customers, There is some evidence that this will be primarily due to the 
increased success of the NAS's. Nondemand factors will likely cancel out, although that 
cancellation involves a reduction in the number of suppliers, some increased outsourcing by the 
manufacturers, and some increase in the manufacturers' level of nondomestic sourcing. Each of 
these developments pose particular threats and opportunities for individual suppliers, as evidenced 
by some expectation of capacity constraint in certain product areas. 
These respondents are not very likely to add capacity, but if they do, it is likely to be in the 
United States. This is not surprising in view of their estimates of the overall capacity situation in 
the industry. Nevertheless, some capacity will be added, and it is likely to evidence a wider 
geographical distribution than cunent facilities, and Westem Europe may significantly benefit from 
those changes. ThIhc Frostbelt is likely to lose share in supplier production activity compared to 
today and faces the largest number of supplier reductions. But it is also likely to secure the largest 
absolute gain in supplier additions, and the largest net gain of any of these regions. 
The challenge for Genesee is to recognize that its large allied GM supplier base poses 
serious risks for losses, and some barriers to securing an adequate share of Frostbelt additions by 
independent suppliers. However, those additions are targets of opportunity for Genesee to pursue. 
Views of International Competition 
We asked our respondents to provide their views on ten different international 
competitors/production locations, and, in some instances, on three regions of the United States. 
The competitor list is composed of Brazil, Canada, China, Eastern Europe, India, Japan, Mexico, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Western Europe. As would be expected, Japan and Canada are viewed 
throughout these issues as a benchmark for competition. However, the relative views on other 
competitors are less consistent, and that makes them both interesting and potentially useful. These 
views suggest how the American supplier community views these competitors and potential 
competitors in relation to each other now, in 1992/1993, and the year 2000. 
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We think these views are important for communities like Genesee because they essentially 
define the competition that Genesee's current automotive endowment faces and that Genesee itself 
faces in securing additional automotive production. That is, these counmes and regions are at once 
competitors in the automotive markets that Genesee serves, and competitors for expanded 
automotive production activity that Genesee may seek. Of course, these respondents represent 
critical decision-makers in Genesee's pursuit of the second goal. 
Seriousness of Competitive Threat. We asked how serious a competitive threat each competitor 
industry poses in the respondent's main product area now, in 199211993, and in the year 2000, 
with 1= not very serious and 5= extremely serious. These data must be viewed cautiously. 
Competitiveness is a complex concept, and here respondents are considering it at its most abstract 
and general level. These responses are summary views across a range of differentiated 
dimensions, and represent a mixture of specific product areas. 
These ten competitors currently average just about 1.9 on our scale, between not very 
serious and extremely serious. The average moves to about 2.3 by 199211993, and reaches just 
under 2.7 by the year 2000. The next decade, then, will see increasingly serious competitive 
threats from this group of countries and regions. 
Figure 3.3 displays the evaluations for five competitors that are currently rated at 2.0 or 
above on our scale. Figure 3.4 presents evaluations for the five that currently fall below 2.0 on 
our scale. If we set 2.5 as the cut point for a moderately serious competitor (rounding to 3.0, the 
scale mid-point), U.S. suppliers now see only two serious competitors, Japan (3.2) and Canada 
(2.9). Mexico (2.1), South Korea and Western Europe (2.0), and Taiwan (1.9) form the next 
competitive tier. The very general nature of these ratings is probably reflected in the grouping of 
Western Europe with these newer, but perhaps more aggressive, competitors. Western Europe is 
probably viewed as a less serious threat than Japan and Canada because of its perceived lack of 
activity, rather than because of a markedly lower capability. Suppliers see Brazil (IS), China and 
Eastern Europe (1.1), and India (1.0) as currently not very serious competitive threats. 
In 199211993, Japan and Canada marginally increase their competitive threat, moving to 
3.1 and 3.4 respectively. South Korea (2.9), Mexico (2.7), and Taiwan (2.5) reach a moderately 
serious level, while China (2.4), Brazil (2.5) and Western Europe (2.5) reach it in 2000. By 
2000, South Korea (3.4) pulls just ahead of Japan (3.3) and Canada (3.2), while Mexico reaches 
3.2 on our scale. Competition is increasing, and the number of credible international competitors 
is likely to grow over the next decade or so. 
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Figure 33:  Competitive Threat to U.S. Suppliers, 
Over Time: Five Competitors 
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Figure 3.4: Competitive Threat to U.S. Suppliers, 
Over Time: Five Additional Competitors 
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China presents an interesting case in point. China scores 1.1 for the current period, tied 
with Eastern Europe and marginally ahead of India. China, at 1.6, is expected to pull ahead of 
Eastern Europe by 199211993, and to pull essentially even with Western Europe and Brazil by 
2000, at nearly 2.5 on our scale. China, of all these competitors, shows the largest percentage 
increases from now to 1992/1993 (0.5 points, 45%) and from 1992/1993 to 2000 (0.8, 50%). 
These suppliers, then, view China as a competitor that is likely to show rapid development, 
perhaps somewhat more rapid during the 199211993 to 2000 period. They clearly believe that 
China will leave the less serious competitor group and establish itself as a moderately serious 
competitor by 2000. 7 
Canada poses the most immediate threat to Genesee, as it has for the past 20 years or so. 
The enhanced competitiveness of Mexico is probably the next most serious threat, because it 
combines many of the advantages of the developing economies, but is geographically much closer 
to the U.S. production base. GM has established numerous production facilities in Mexico over 
the past decade, and these pose serious challenges for products that are labor-intense but low in 
technical skill requirements. We see Taiwan and South Korea, whose currencies have not 
strengthened against the dollar as much as the yen has, to challenge more for business already lost 
overseas, especially to Japan. However, their emergence decreases the likelihood that much of that 
work can be brought back to the United States. 
Competitive Dimensions. We asked respondents to rate each producing region on five dimensions: 
quality, cost, technology, material resources, and market potential. For this set of ratings we 
included three U.S. regions (the Frostbelt, the Midsouth, and other), so there are 13 locations 
under consideration. These ratings, presented in Table 3.5, provide more detailed evaluations that 
may form the bases for the summary ratings of competitive threat discussed above. In fact, if we 
take an unweighted average of each of the ten non-U, S. region's scores across these five 
dimensions, we find virtually the same rank ordering that we observe on the summary measure. 
The major exception, Western Europe, is just behind Canada on the sum of these five dimensions, 
while it falls at least 0.5 scale points behind Canada for each of the three time periods of the 
summary measure. That is consistent with the suspicion that its lower ranking on the summary 
measure does not reflect its capability, but rather its strategic decisions about where to compete. 
The U.S. locations differ quite substantially from these ten competitors when we compare 
their averages on these five performance dimensions. While the U.S. locations incur a substantial 
"we suspect that these views vculd be markedly diffemt today. in June of 1989. bemuse of the m t  tunnod in hbu. 
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disadvantage in production cost (3.1 vs. 3.7), they possess clear advantages on the other four 
dimensions, exceeding this group of competitors by a substantial margin on each: 3.7 vs. 2.7 on 




on Performance Demensions 
But these regions compete individually, not as a group, so comparisons of individual 
locations are more important for business decisions. U.S. locations are rated fairly competitively 
on the summary measure of these dimensions in comparison with individual competitor regions as 
well. The Frostbelt and the Midsouth average 3.8, behind Japan at 4.0, but ahead of Canada at 















However, a company's product, the bases of competition appropriate to its industry 
segment, and the basis of competition it selects influence both the relative importance of these 
performance dimensions and the company's relevant competitors. Japan is the clear quality leader, 
followed by Canada, Westem Europe, the Frostbelt, and the  ids south.^ India, China, and 
8 
In view of the increasing importance of quality as a supplier selection criterion, the U.S. performance, espcciPlly in comparison to Canada and 
Western Eumpe, is disappointing. 
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Eastern Europe fall at 2.0 or lower on quality. Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, and China are the 
production cost leaders, all scoring at or above 4.0, while Western Europe and the Frostbelt fall 
below 3.0 on this dimension. Japan is the clear leader in technical capability, followed by the 
Frostbelt and Western Europe. India, China, Brazil, and Mexico all fall below 2.5 on this 
dimension. In terms of material supply, the Frostbelt, Canada, and the Midsouth are the leaders, 
and India, China, and Eastern Europe the farthest behind. The U.S. locations, Canada, Western 
Europe, and Japan lead in market potential, while India and Eastern Europe trail substantially. 
If we think of these competitors as comprising two groups, developed and developing, it is 
clear that the developed competitors typically score lowest on the production cost dimension. For 
the developing competitors, production cost is typically the highest rated performance dimension. 
Thus the balance of competitive strengths and weaknesses differ for these two types of 
competitors, and that suggests that the balance of competitive strength between them depends on 
the exact markets and products under consideration. 
The average of the three U.S. regions, weighted by their proportion of current locations, 
puts the United States second to Japan on the summary measure of these five performance 
dimensions, and essentially tied with Canada. However, the pattern of performance differs across 
the three U.S. locations. Thus the Midsouth has a production cost advantage over the Frostbelt, 
but lags the Frostbelt in both technical capability and material supply, although these regions 
essentially are the same on the summary performance measure. The "other U.S." location is 
behind both the Frostbelt and the Midsouth on the summary measure. But it does seem that the 
Frostbelt and the Midsouth offer relatively balanced and strong competitive performance across 
these dimensions. While the Midsouth cannot compete with many of the competitor regions on 
cost, it compensates for this weakness with considerably stronger performance than those regions 
on other dimensions. The Frostbelt may be even weaker than the Midsouth in its competitive cost 
position, but it is comparatively even stronger than the Midsouth on technical capacity and material 
supply. 
What are the implications of these results for the competitiveness of the United States as a 
source of automotive parts and components? The United States, with a weighted average of 3.00 
on production cost, is ahead of only Western Europe on this critical performance measure, and 
may be noncompetitive in parts and components where this is the only basis of competition, few as 
they may number. But it should be noted that the United States cost position has improved against 
many of these competitors as the dollar weakened over the past few years. These data, in our 
judgement, do not appear to fully reflect these recent developments. For more typical products, 
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where competition is multidimensional, the United States is quite competitive. For products where 
cost is relatively more important, the Midsouth is quite a strong competitor in terms of these five 
performance dimensions, second only to Japan. For products where technical capacity and/or 
material supply are more critical dimensions, the Frostbelt is extremely competitive, also second 
only to Japan. 
The Frostbelt, then, and by extension, Genesee, is likely to be more successful in pursuing 
automotive production goods that are relatively low in labor content, so that its perceived high cost 
position is less relevant, and those goods where technical capacity and material supply issues are 
more critical, so that its stronger perfoxmance dimensions are relatively more important. 
However, if products are "lower in labor content," they provide fewer jobs than high labor 
content products, and probably fewer jobs than Genesee's current product mix. In the long run, 
Genesee simply cannot depend on automotive production to provide the high levels of employment 
it has in the past. Even an outstandingly successful strategy to preserve Genesee's current share of 
GM employment faces the reality that the number of jobs will fall, as industry employment falls in 
response to competition, efficiency, and restructuring. 
Diversification within the automotive sector must recognize that components and parts with 
high labor content are likely to move. They may form a useful part of a transitional strategy to 
preserve levels of employment. However, lower labor content jobs are more likely to become a 
relatively permanent element of the Genesee economy, and thus play a more enduring role in an 
economic development strategy. 
Production Site Decisions 
The redistribution of production capacity in the face of industry overcapacity is a major 
focus of this survey, and that process will be in part driven by the fundamental factors influencing 
company decisions to select one from among many possible sites. This is particularly critical since 
our respondents make it clear that they primarily view the ten non-U.S. regions as sources for 
parts, components, and vehicles, rather than markets. Our respondents provided ratings of the 
importance of twelve considerations or factors in deciding where to locate a manufacturing 
operation. Table 3.6 displays these results. 
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All these items were rated below 3.0, and thus on the more important side of the scaleg On 
balance, these considerations are little differentiated by these suppliers. However, the results do 
establish labor force attitude as the most important of these considerations, averaging 1.7 on our 
scale. Loaded cost for both direct (2.1) and indirect (2.2) labor and proximity to customers (2.2) 
form the next cluster, with all of the rest falling into a third cluster. 
Table 3.6 
Importance of Factors 
in Manufacturing Siting Decisions 
There appears to be some inconsistency in the importance these respondents assign to direct 
and indirect labor costs and their responses to some of the other items in the survey. They rate 
both hourly and salaried labor costs, as discussed below, as important, but the least important by a 
considerable margin, of ten performance areas that the United States must improve to stay 
competitive. They also rate the U.S. weighted average for production cost as competitively ahead 
of only Western Europe among the ten competitor regions. Yet the United States will be the 
location of over half of the net additions to capacity developed from these responses. It is difficult 
to reconcile this emphasis on labor cost as a site selection factor with a much lower emphasis on 
the need to improve U.S. performance in the labor cost area, in light of the still heavy, albeit 
somewhat declining, emphasis upon U.S. siting for capacity investments. 
Siting Factor 
Labor Force Attitudes 
Loaded Direct Labor Cost 
Loaded Indirect Labor Cost 
Proximity to Customers 
Transportation Infrastructure 
Skill of Local Hourly Labor 
Availability and Cost of Utilities 
Loaded Salaried Labor Cost 
Skill of Local Salaried Labor 
Skill of Local Middle Management 
Proximity to Suppliers 
Land Cost 
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* On a scale with 1 = Major Importance, 3 = Moderate Importance, 
and 5 = Little Importance 
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However, it is important to recognize that these views, whether or not they are logical or 
consistent, do influence site selection decisions. And this is a handicap for Genesee. Genesee is a 
high labor cost location, and is likely to remain so. It also has the reputation of having a labor 
force with a confrontational, uncooperative attitude and lacking in a strong work ethic. While 
Genesee would score quite well on most of the other factors, decisions may be overwhelmed by 
these first three, especially labor force attitude. Any strategy for pursuing new automotive facilities 
will have to confront this drawback and develop information to correct it and offset it. 
Supplier Selection Criteria 
The vehicle assembly operations are the ultimate customers for automotive suppliers, 
whether independent or allied, and manufacturer purchasing representatives are thus the critical 
decision-makers. As overcapacity increases the competition among suppliers, the criteria used by 
purchasing become even more critical than in the past, when supplier capacity may have been more 
closely matched the demands of the manufacturers. 
We asked our respondents to rate the importance that their OEM customers place on a 
variety of supplier characteristics when they decide where to place their business. We asked them 
to indicate the importance of each characteristic for three time periods: 1977, the glory years of the 
old traditional industry; now, 1988; and 1990/1992, a few years into the future. These responses 
indicate interesting changes from the past to the present, and expectations about future 
developments. Since they represent supplier beliefs about their customers' selection criteria, they 
suggest the suppliers' views of the bases of competition in the industry. 
The supplier selection decision in the late 1970s was dominated by short-term price at 4.1, 
followed by delivery reliability at 3.3, almost one full scale point behind. Manufacturing 
competence and past performance, both at 3.1, were the only other factors that receive scores 
above 3.0, the "moderately important" point of the scale. 
Quality (4.3), long-term price (4.2), and delivery (4.1) are currently more important than 
short-term price (3.9), and manufacturing competence (3.9) is essentially tied with it. By 
199011992, quality (4.7), delivery ( 4 3 ,  long-term price (4.3, manufacturing competence (4.4), 
and engineering competence (4.4) are clearly expected to form the cluster of the most important 
selection criteria, displayed in Figure 3.5. Product (4.0) and process (3.9) innovation, effective 
management (3.9), and past performance (3.9) cluster with short-term price (3.8) behind this first 
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set of factors, while financial resources (3.7) and location (3.3) are still expected to trail short-term 
price. This cluster of factors is displayed in Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.5: Supplier Selection Criteria 
These suppliers, then, see rather dramatic changes in the manufacturers' selection criteria as 
we move from the past through the present to the mid-term future. Over time, all these criteria 
except short-term price increase in importance. Short-term price's absolute scale score falls from 
4.1 to 3.9, and then to 3.8. To be sure, these are not major changes. But the relative ranking of 
short-term price shifts dramatically, as it falls from most important, by a significant margin, in 
1977, to tied for fourth now, and to 10th in the future. Quite simply, more factors are rapidly 
becoming more important, and short-term price at best maintains the absolute level of importance it 
has held in the past. 
As we look to the future, we find a new set of important selection criteria, but they are first 
among 12 criteria, all of which are now above 3.0 on the scale. No single factor dominates the 
selection decision as short-term price did in the past. The lowest ranking criteria for the future is 
supplier location at 3.3. In the past, only four criteria were rated above 3.0. 
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Figure 3.6: Supplier Selection Criteria 
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These data suggest that the sourcing decision has become more complex, and is likely to 
become even more complex in the future. More factors are important and therefore are considered 
in the decision, and no one strong supplier characteristic is likely to offset a series of weak ratings, 
as short-term price often could in the past. These data also imply that a traditional strategy for new 
entrants -- quoting a low price to "buy the business" and then demonstrating their competence -- is 
less likely to succeed now than in the past, and even less likely in the future. On the other hand, the 
stress on supplier proximity to facilitate Just-In-Time arrangements has by no means become an 
insurmountable barrier. It is a moderately important selection criteria, but it is the least important on 
this list. 
Three aspects of these data merit comment. First, a vision of a broadly competent supplier 
seems to be emerging in the manufacturers' selection criteria. This supplier delivers high quality, 
to schedule, at a competitive long-term price, and has strong manufacturing and engineering 
capabilities. The preferred supplier will be good across the board, rather than simply best on one 
or two criteria. The two most important selection criteria in 1977 are separated by 0.8 scale points; 
in 199011992, eight criteria are within 0.8 scale points of the most important factor, quality. These 
broader, more balanced selection criteria do not support a supplier strategy of narrow strength. 
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Second, quality has emerged as the most important criteria, although as the "first among 
equals" rather than as the single dominant factor. Quality shows the greatest gain, in both absolute 
and relative terms, from the past through the present to the future. The industry now recognizes 
that quality is not separable from these other selection criteria, resting on a foundation of 
manufacturing and engineering strength, and contributing to long-term competitive prices. But this 
is a profound change from the past, and one that should continue to contribute to the industry's 
long-term competitive strength and survival. 
Third, we first asked these questions in 1982-1983, and at that time the "future" we asked 
about was the current time frame. Suppliers then expected quality, delivery, manufacturing 
competence, and engineering competence to exceed short-term price in importance by now. The 
reports for this survey indicate that quality and delivery have indeed surpassed short-term price, 
while manufacturing competence has essentially tied it, and engineering competence is close 
behind That provides some confidence that these supplier expectations about the future have some 
value and are not simply wishful speculation. There is another noteworthy change in these 
estimates over the past years, and that is that many more selection criteria are expected to become 
as important as short-term price than was the case in early administrations of this question. This 
again suggests the increasingly complex supplier selection decisions in the industry today and 
tomorrow compared to yesterday. 
It is not appropriate to interpret these data as indicating that piece-price competition is dead 
in the automotive industry, or that current price quotes are competitively unimportant. If piece- 
price competition has receded somewhat, it is not dead, and probably never will be. The near-term 
price is an important part of a supplier's competitive offer, and will remain so. The critical point is 
that the industry now better understands its relationship to these other criteria and, especially, its 
failure to be a perfect, or even a good, indicator of a supplier's overall competitive strength. 
Consequently, while it is and will remain important, it will not dominate the supplier selection 
decision as it often did in the past. 
These data are potentially troubling for allied suppliers. Most of them lack their own 
product engineering support function, and these data suggest that that will be an increasingly 
important capability for the future, as do the data presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 of the previous 
Chapter. Ln the past, allied suppliers relied on corporate engineering, effectively making to print. 
But that support is being withdrawn as the engineering function contracts, and it is unclear that 
allied suppliers will be in a position to expand their own product engineering. Lack of engineering 
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is a problem for any supplier that wishes to be first-tier, but is a special problem for allied suppliers 
because being first-tier is probably more critical to their survival than it is for independent 
suppliers. After all, it makes less sense to maintain an indirect than a direct supplier as part of 
manufacturer operations, and the higher value-added work of the fmt-tier supplier is probably 
necessary far allied suppliers to maintain their traditional practices and patterns. 
One of Genesee's sets of supplier plants should be in relatively decent shape in terms of 
engineering. AC-Rochester is headquartered in Flint, and much of AC's engineering has 
traditionally been performed there. The engineering issue is more of a problem at the other GM 
supplier facilities, especially those that have historically survived by making many different parts 
and components. Most of these facilities are relatively weak in their own product engineering, and 
what they possess almost certainly is insufficient to cover a wide product span. The recent move 
of BOC engineering to Flint may attract more independent engineering houses to Flint, and that 
would provide opportunity for these facilities to compensate for that weakness. In any case, the 
ready availability of engineering service f m s  within an hour's drive provides Genesee's GM 
supplier plants with a significant advantage over many GM facilities that are more remotely located 
from this resource. 
Quality is clearly emerging as a major concern in the automotive industry, and decisions 
increasingly are reflecting this. The perception of Genesee in the industry has a number of 
negative elements, but poor quality has not been one of them. On the other hand, good quality has 
not been been an especially strong element of its reputation either. The outstanding performance of 
the LeSabre in 1989, and the extensive publicity of that achievement, can only help Genesee, to the 
extent that it provides a halo effect. The improved sales of LeSabre in a falling market may also 
provide a local lesson that quality sells, and help energize efforts to improve quality at other 
Genesee plants. 
Summary 
The domestic automotive industry and GM indeed face a situation of likely overcapacity, 
and that situation extends to suppliers as well. Genesee's current suppliers are virtually all GM 
allied suppliers, and while that may help them retain GM business, it may hurt them in obtaining 
new business from GM competitors, especially the NAM's. In any case, NAM domestic content 
may be inadvertently constrained by CAFE regulations. Nevertheless, there are products that may 
well be capacity constrained, including parts for seats, vehicle bodies, and fuel systems. 
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Given a situation of overcapacity, does it make sense for Genesee to pursue independent 
suppliers that are not currently located in the county? The answer to this is a qualified yes. The 
Frostbelt reveals the largest number of expected facility additions and net gain, and Genesee is part 
of the Frostbelt. It has some particular disadvantages and advantages, but it is sensible to pursue 
the automotive opportunities that will develop in the next few years. 
The Frostbelt is viewed as having high labor cost, but significant advantages in technical 
skill and material supply. This suggests that Genesee should focus on some types of products 
more than on others, depending on the time horizon. High labor content products are more 
appropriate for a near-term strategy, while those with critical skill and material supply 
characteristics are more preservable, and thus appropriate for a longer-term strategy. The primary 
international competitors to Genesee in the next few years are likely to be Canada and Mexico, 
rather than the emerging Asian automotive supply bases. 
Supplier selection criteria have shifted, and that shift offers Genesee an opportunity to 
retain proportionately more of its GM activity. The enhanced importance of some criteria provide 
Genesee the opportunity to develop strength in these areas rapidly. Genesee's location should 
provide it an advantage in increasing the engineering content its facilities provide, and some 
advantage in developing a reputation for high quality. 
The negative view of the Genesee workforce attitude remains a real and substantial barrier 
to securing new facilities, as does the less comgible GM dominance of the local labor market. 
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Introduction 
Chapter Three argues that there is indeed a series of competitive challenges facing the 
traditional North American supplier base today, and that these are compounded by the problems 
facing their major customers, the Big Three. Among these problems is a serious one of 
overcapacity, but the changing structure of the industry dictates that there will be products that will 
be capacity constrained. Suppliers recognize this, and indicate strong expectations that capacity 
will be added, and that many of those facilities will be in the U.S. Frostbelt, which includes 
Genesee. 
This chapter will review the GM facilities in Genesee. It will provide, to the extent that 
available information permits, plant level estimates of facility usage, products, and number of 
employees. While there will be brief discussion of the general situation of the plant, the focus of 
the review will be on threats from outsourcing. The primary sources of information are GM itself 
and publicly available sources. This chapter also draws heavily on our interviews with industry 
experts to inform the analysis and recommendations. The interview instrument is contained in 
Appendix Two. 
Buick City Complex 
The Buick City Complex is the largest GM facility in Genesee. It incorporates Buick City 
Assembly, the Hydra-matic operations, BOC Engine Plant #36, AxleForge Plant #3 1, and a small 
Delco plant. We will review each of these operations separately, then comment on the Complex as 
an entity. 
Buick City Assembly appears much stronger than it was just two years ago. Willow Run will 
produce the Chevrolet Caprice, and the Pontiac Bonneville has shifted from Willow Run to 
Wentzville. The four-door Olds 88 is now produced at Buick City along with the LeSabre and 
two-door 88. Thus the rationalization of H-car production has not injured Buick City, which 
should now have sufficient production for normal two-shift operation for the next few years. 
The Buick LeSabre was rated second among all passenger cars marketed in the United 
States in the 1989 J.D. Powers Initial Quality Survey, up from the bottom quartile in the 1987 
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rankings. This achievement should be an asset for the plant if market conditions require any 
further consolidation of H-car production, unlikely as that may be. This product performance 
builds on Buick City's notable process performance in both Just-In-Time delivery and as 
somewhat a process technology test site for GM. The plant now routinely ranks among the best 
GM plants by the corporation's own measures of quality, schedule performance, and inventory 
control. 
The H-cars are cunently scheduled for a major facelift in 1992, and that is the earliest likely 
time for any risk of closure. If risk of closure is minimal, there still is a risk of job loss at the plant 
through the outsourcing of work it now performs to supplier plants, whether allied or independent. 
Moves to modular sourcing and manufacturing increases this threat. Modular sourcing 
refers to the practice of buying built-up sub-assemblies or modules rather than purchasing the 
discrete parts and components and assembling them in the final assembly plant. The rationales for 
pursuing this strategy have to do with the costs associated with the work, and, in some cases, the 
quality of the module. 
However, as Table 2.4 in Chapter Two indicates, modular sourcing is moving at a slower 
than expected pace. Moreover, Buick City has already "modularized" and outsourced the most 
common assembly plant components: seats and wheels come into the plant as built-up modules. It 
is possible that other modules will develop, most probably in door build-up and instrument panel 
assembly. These are labor intensive operations and might well be better performed prior to final 
assembly. 
The most damaging outsourcing loss at Buick City would be the loss of in-plant stamping 
of major panels. This activity's low operating rates is a continual irritation to at least some of the 
more traditional planners at GM, and there are problems with using to service other plants. 
Countering these threats is the fact that adjacent stamping is a strategy that is finding increasing 
acceptance in the Big Three, and is part of the Saturn facility. Further, the "fit and finish" of the 
car's sheet metal is felt to be an important determinant of the customer's evaluation of its overall 
quality, so the LeSabre's quality ratings may provide some protection for continued in-plant 
stamping. 
Buick City Assembly appears to be relatively safe, and is not likely to lose large amounts of 
work to outsourcing of parts and components. Employment at Buick City Assembly is variously 
estimated at 4,000 to 5,000. We assume these variations reflect whether or not the stamping 
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operations are included in the total. The plant faces continued challenges to increase its 
productivity while maintaining its new found reputation for quality and process excellence. If door 
build-up and instrument panel assembly are resourced, the plant might lose at most 100 or so jobs. 
If stamping is resourced, the loss could approach 1,000, but we think this is unlikely. 
On balance, we think there is a low overall risk of outsourcing at Assembly, with a 
probable job loss of no more than 100 or so. If more extensive re-sourcing does develop, other 
Genesee facilities can probably bid on the work. If stamping is pulled from Buick City, Grand 
Blanc would be a possible source, as would Flint Met-Fab. Met Fab faces more serious risks than 
Grand Blanc, and, unfortunately, might be less likely to secure the work. Door modules might 
represent a product opportunity for Coldwater Road, and the Delco Instrumentation plant in the AC 
Rochester Complex could pursue modular instrument panels. If these shifts developed, re- 
sourcing might not adversely affect Genesee. 
Buick City Assembly is important to Genesee. Most of the experts we interviewed see 
assembly plants as the critical underpinnings, or core facilities, of the Genesee automotive 
economy. They are the facilities that have holding power for the others. Moreover, the plant has 
received extensive and favorable notice in the industry press for its achievements, and this helps to 
counteract Genesee's image as a bad production location. 
BOC Engine, is one of the newest of GM's engine plants, and currently produces two V-6 
engines, the 3.1 and 3.8 liter, manufactures blocks and heads, and machines crankshafts and 
camshafts. The product program looks relatively safe through the 1995 period in view of 
constrained capacity in these engines. Both these engines are due for changes in 1991, and the old 
3.1 is tentatively scheduled for termination in 1994. It seems unlikely that this plant will close in 
the foreseeable future. Whether it secures the changed 3.1 or additional 3.8 capacity in 1994 will 
be an useful indicator of its viability through the late 1990s. 
Engine plants are not immune to resourcing pressures. The engine plant of the future might 
be quite different from those we find today. Richard Hervey of Sigma Associates has suggested 
that there are at least two different models for the way engine plants might develop in the next ten 
to twenty One model calls for large regional engine plants that serve a number of assembly 
plants. Much of the machining and casting work would be performed elsewhere, although they 
'~entey, Richard P. "Engine Manufacturing Strategies for the 1990s," Aim Newsletter, 1,3, pp. 4-8, 
June, 1986. 
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might acquire much of the engine "dressing" work currently completed in the vehicle assembly 
plants. The other model calls for adjacent, dedicated engine plants that serve primarily, and 
typically exclusively, a neighboring assembly plant. This is the Saturn model. These plants 
would have smaller volumes, and would also probably lose the many functions that the regional 
engine plant is likely to shed. 
While a shift to either of these models is not yet clear, the key point is that the distribution 
of engine work among casting, engine, and assembly plants is not fued, and could alter. BOC 
Engine could lose its manufacturing and/or machining work to upstream suppliers, possibly 
balanced by pulling work back from the assembly plants. BOC Engine employs roughly 4,000 
workers, with about 25% of them in skilled trades. This suggests that probably no more than 500 
are at risk if machining work is resourced. On balance, this is unlikely in the next few years, 
although there probably will be sporadic changes in the exact placement of work across these 
different types of plants. 
Buick City Hydra-matic manufactures a number of transmission components, including shafts and 
planetary gear sets, for the 4L60 and 3T40 transmissions. It also makes two torque converters, the 
245MM and the 298MM. Roughly twethirds of the employees of the Buick City Axle plant were 
transferred to Hydramatic about eighteen months ago, and they produce gears and pinions, as well 
as carriers for the 4L60. 
The 3T40 transmission is a 3-speed automatic that will probably be replaced by the mid- 
1990s. Meanwhile, it has a relatively decent market, because it is used in the Cavalier and the 
Corsica-Beretta. The 4L60 is a Cspeed automatic that is widely used throughout the GM fleet of 
full size, front-wheel drive cars, including the new W-cars, So demand for components for these 
transmissions should be strong. Both torque converters are strong, and are components in a 
number of transmissions, including both rear-wheel and front-wheel drive vehicles. 
This plant is probably more at risk from capacity consolidation than from outsourcing in the 
normal sense of the word. GM's declining volumes suggest that such consolidation is likely. 
However, Hydra-matic's Three Rivers plant has been transferred to the Saginaw Division, and 
Muncie is now under a joint venture with Chrysler in manual transmissions. The key question is 
whether volumes decline and productivity improves to the point that Genesee activities can be 
consolidated at Willow Run. This is unlikely in the next few years, although it could develop 
towards the end of the 1990s. 
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The major outsourcing threat comes from the possibility that machining work will be 
transferred to plants that cast the parts for Hydra-matic. This may be more likely as "near net 
shape" casting becomes more prevalent, and much of the need for rough machining as distinct 
from precision machining lessens. Mitigating against this is the plant's reputation for a skilled and 
good workforce. 
The plant employed about 3,300 workers in summer, 1989. It has a high proportion of 
skilled workers (60%+ of the production workforce), and these are the ones most threatened by re- 
sourcing machining. Again, we think this is unlikely to develop substantially in the next few 
years, although some jobs could be lost over that period. 
Buick City A l e  and Forge, as discussed above, has undergone a major reduction in size with the 
transfer of the bulk of its workforce and space to Hydra-matic. It continues to make water pumps, 
lightweight pistons, brake parts, and some stampings, including engine covers and exhaust 
manifolds. The plant is composed of numerous small departments, and truly seems to be an "odds 
and ends" plant, lacking in product focus and organizational tightness. Some parts are engine 
related and some are not. 
The threats to this plant are serious, and all center around GM's attempts to rationalize its 
operations and shed excess capacity. Product diversity can be a source of strength in a 
manufacturing operation, helping it weather the cyclical nature of many markets. However, the 
Axle plant receives little of this benefit since its products depend on the same final market -- vehicle 
sales. Diversity can also be a handicap for a manufacturing plant, interfering with coordination and 
coherent effort. This can disadvantage a plant in corporate-wide comparisons of cost, 
productivity, and quality. Such plants are often viewed as phasing out, and that is particularly true 
when the parent company is trying to rationalize its operations. 
Everything this plant currently makes is a prime candidate for outsourcing or resourcing to 
another GM facility. Pistons, for example, could go to Tonawanda, and most of the other 
products offer a wide range of options, both within GM and at independent suppliers. The plant 
faces intense competition from outside suppliers, and many of its products are facing stiff 
challenges from offshore. This competition has increased as Japanese suppliers have set up 
operations in the United States. 
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While we were unable to obtain current employment for this plant, it is probably in the 
range of, at most, 650 or so, and likely smaller. Coldwater Road is a potential local bidder for 
much, and possibly all, of the work currently performed at the Axle plant. 
Buick City Delco Products makes suspension springs, and is likely to close in the next few years, 
as GM rationalizes capacity and consolidates production in Livonia in the face of its declining 
vehicle build. Its employment by summer, 1989, had fallen some 100 from its 1987 level of about 
250. 
The significance of this facility is that it adds another management group to the Buick City 
Complex. It is unclear to us why it is located in Buick City, so we see it as a prime candidate for 
closure in the face of excess capacity. 
Buick City Complex is the direct descendant of the old Buick manufacturing facilities, and 
represents an attempt to establish a fairly integrated, diversified product, centralized manufacturing 
facility. 
The facility continues to face a serious problem of organizational and production flow 
complexity. There are multiple GM management groups represented in the facility, and they must 
coordinate with each other as well as their divisional base. Some of its product leaves and returns. 
Torque converters and transmission parts leave Hydra-matic and return in transmissions bound for 
Buick City Assembly. Represented workers at the Complex are all members of one local (599), 
and thus have bumping rights throughout the Complex. That supports a "Complex-wide" labor 
climate, rather than the more typical "plant-wide" climate. The Union is forced to coordinate with 
different plant and GM Corporate managements. 
These problems certainly prevent the Complex from being as efficient as it theoretically can 
be and enhancing the survivability of the set of plants beyond the survivability of its individual 
constituent plants. But the resolution of these problems almost certainly means job losses for 
Genesee, because they probably require removing some of the plants. While the Axle and Delco 
plants are liable to close, some of our experts would even remove Hydra-matic because of the 
logical placement of its operations at a much earlier stage of production. That would leave Buick 
City with BOC Engine and Assembly plants. 
Truck and Bus is an assembly plant in the GM Truck & Bus Group. The past decade has seen 
steady growth in the truck share of the U.S. light duty vehicle market (cars plus light trucks) such 
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that these vehicles now comprise just over 32% of the market. The Big Three, and especially GM, 
have been more successful competing against imports in the light truck end of the market, holding 
about 87% of that market in 1989, as GM increased it share to nearly 36%. That makes these 
vehicles increasingly important in their own right, but also as a source of demand for parts and 
component facilities. GM markets vehicles in this segment under two nameplates, Chevrolet and 
GMC, with the GMC versions typically being somewhat more upscale and higher priced. 
Truck & Bus Assembly traditionally ran two lines and employed over 8,000 people. Line 
#1 shut down in May of 1987, with a loss of 3,600 jobs. The plant was unable to secure the 
GMT400 program that replaced the full size CJK truck the line had made. Line #2 assembles the 
Suburban, Chevrolet Blazer, and the GMC Blazer-equivalent Jimmy, and the replacement 
program for those vehicles is going to Janesville. 
GM has now announced the transfer of production for its full size "G" van to Truck & 
Bus. This vehicle's market share fell about one-half point from 1988 to 1989, reflecting the 
continued increase in sales of smaller vans. Nevertheless, the commercial demand for this vehicle 
provides a reasonable sales base. The major threat to the plant comes in 1993, when a minor 
facelift might provide the opportunity to move the vehicle as part of capacity consolidation. We 
really view the placement of the "G" van as another chance for Truck & Bus Assembly to prove 
itself rather than as a clear sign of success. Perhaps more than any other facility in Genesee, this is 
the one that suffers from a bad reputation, whether deservedly or not. The workforce is seen as 
recalcitrant and extremely resistant to any kind of change. 
Outsourcing does not represent a clear threat to this facility at this time. GM product plans 
to not appear to involve sourcing captive imports or NAMs to serve this segment of the light truck 
market. But the loss of this program in 1993 remains a distinct possibility. 
Flint Met Fab produces a range of stampings (floor pans, e.g.), but most of its output consists of 
engine cradles and exterior sheet metal. About 60% of its output goes to car programs, and 
roughly 40% is for trucks. Met Fab is threatened by two situations facing all large GM stamping 
facilities. First, the corporation is viewed as having far too much capacity. Second, the 
corporation's effective capacity will increase dramatically as the plants improve their performance, 
especially in the area of equipment uptime. These facilities are often reported to be actually 
operating at about half the rate of comparable Japanese plants. This, then, is a product area that is 
plagued by overcapacity. 
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Within that overall challenge, Met Fab receives mixed reviews. One of our experts 
described it as one of the worst stamping facilities he has ever seen, while another commented on 
its improvement, and a third identified it as one of GM's best. Unfortunately for GM, these may 
not be inconsistent views. 
Met Fab's Center section has received capital investment, and makes engine cradles for a 
number of car programs, including the W-cars, and G-van frames. East section is probably the 
most modern, and does the sheet metal for the GMT400 and miscellaneous work for G-vans. West 
section is the most at risk, losing work, receiving little capital investment, and finding little new 
product. 
Met Fab, along with other stamping plants, like Grand Blanc Stamping, or parts and 
component plants that do some stamping, such as AC Rochester Plant 2 West (old Flint 
Manufacturing) or Coldwater Road, face some uncertainty due to possible material changes. The 
specific risks are that plastics and/or other lighter weight material will replace stamped steel in the 
traditional vehicle. This appears to be less of a general threat than it was a few years ago. It is, 
however, likely that some of the outsourcing of smaller stampings will involve replacement of steel 
by lighter weight materials. 
Met Fab produces a variety of medium and small stampings that are likely candidates for 
outsourcing to independent stampers over the next few years, although Coldwater Road might bid 
for some of this work. This outsourcing may pennit the facility to concentrate and focus its efforts 
in ways that improve its attained quality and productivity, and hence increase its odds of survival. 
The resourcing of products for cars to BOC and CPC stamping operations as capacity consolidates 
is also a threat to Met Fab. Some of this work might go to Grand Blanc. 
Met Fab employed about 4,500 workers in late 1987, the most recent estimates available. 
It is difficult to estimate how many are threatened by outsourcing, but the number through the mid- 
1990s could be quite large. 
AC Rochester Complex currently employs some 6,200 workers spread over six distinct facilities, 
including the old Flint Manufacturing plant that was transferred two years ago. A seventh plant, 
the Instrumentation plant, has been transferred to Delco Electronics. The old AC division has 
merged with the Rochester division, and fortunately selected Flint as its headquarters, preserving 
administrative and research employment of somewhat under 2,000. 
Chapter 4: Genesee GM Facilities 
Plant 1 West is a stamping facility that makes G-van doors, exhaust manifolds, radiator 
supports, and does some injection molding. Its summer, 1989, employment was about 1,150. 
Plant 2 East produces mechanical and electronic fuel pumps and fuel senders, radiator caps, and a 
variety of other products. It employs roughly 1,500 people. Plant 2 West, formerly Flint 
Manufacturing, makes fuel tanks, valves, and some SMC (Sheet Molded Compound) parts, like 
medium truck grilles. It has about 1,000 workers. Plant 3 East produces spark plugs for gasoline- 
powered engines and glow plugs for diesel engines, and employs about 1,450 workers. Plant 6 
East makes crankcase breathers, metal and plastic air cleaners, and some sensors. It employs 
about 550. Plant 7 East's 550 employees make a variety of air and oil fdters. The Delco plant, the 
largest of these facilities at over 5,000 employees as of late 1987, makes parts and components for 
instrument displays, electronic controls, and a range of plastic moldings. 
AC Rochester is the sole source for catalytic converters to GM, but this work is performed 
at plants outside of Genesee County. The division is focusing on air, fuel, and ignition systems, 
and some critical components are not made in Genesee. For example, fuel rails are made in 
Rochester, NY, and injectors in Coopersville, MI. But the division is strong in product 
engineering, and that is a major weakness for most other GM allied supplier plants. 
It seems to us that AC Rochester faces significant loss of work to outside suppliers. The 
product mix of the Complex presents a variety of threats, and it is difficult to predict exactly the 
ones that will result in losses versus the ones that will be overcome. But it is highly likely that 
some of these products will be lost. 
Some of AC Rochester's products are difficult to consider within the "core" automotive 
business of GM, especially as that definition continues to contract. Moreover, some of them are 
unusually exposed to potential outside competitors. Much of the stamping work performed at 
Plant 1 West would seem to face a high risk of outsourcing to independent or other GM suppliers. 
Stamping is not a critical process for AC Rochester, and that makes it a likely candidate for 
outsourcing. Plant 2 West faces severe threats. There are numerous independent sources for 
SMC, and gas tanks may increasingly be made of plastic. The filter products of Plant 7 East and 
the cleaners of Plant 6 East, in particular, seem to be prime candidates to be produced outside of 
GM. They are mature, commodity-like products with very low entry-barriers. Not only are there 
significant outside competitors, but further capacity could readily and rapidly become available 
should AC abandon these products. 
Chapter 4: Genesee GM Facilities 
Plant 3 East's spark plugs represent a more complicated case. They certainly do not seem to 
be "core" products for GM, but it is less clear that they are commodity products, although most 
would view them that way. There do appear to be barriers to entry: making spark-plugs, simple as 
the end-product may be, is not so simple a task, primarily because of ,the ceramic content and the 
precise process control required to obtain the specified resistance. There is excess capacity outside 
GM, but it is unclear that it is sufficient to meet GM's needs. The replacement of the traditional 8- 
cylinder engine of a decade ago with 6- and Ccylinder engines and longer plug life clearly reduces 
demand for spark plugs. Both these circumstances have £reed up capacity at Allied's Autolite and 
Champion, for example. There are also more readily available offshore suppliers today than a 
decade ago. 
On balance, it seems likely that there will be enough resourcing and consolidation in the AC 
Rochester Complex to close one of these plants. It is impossible to say how much of that 
resourcing will be within the Complex itself, and how much to other Genesee GM facilities. The 
stamping work of 1 West and 2 West could be combined, perhaps adding the metal cleaners from 6 
East. The stamping work could also go to Coldwater Road, but it could just as well go to any of a 
number of independents. 
AC Rochester is in a better position than most allied GM suppliers to gain new work to 
replace lost products. It has product engineering and seems to be emphasizing system or modular 
products. The diversity of experience and customer base may provide it with an edge in securing 
nonGM business compared to other part and component operations, and that appears to be a 
priority for AC Rochester management. 
The 1989 University of Michigan Delphi projections suggest that the automotive market 
for electronic controls and components will expand substantially by 1995, and even more by 2000. 
The Delco Instrumentation plant may well benefit from this shift in on-vehicle electronics usage. 
However, these products may be outsourced to the large and competitive electronics supplier 
industry. This plant might be a candidate for modular assembly of instrument panels. 
Inland Fisher GuidelColdwater Road makes over 20 products, including rear-deck and door 
hinges, power seat adjustors, window regulators, headliners, steel moldings, and a variety of 
small stampings. The plant currently has contracts with Saturn, Corsicfleretta, APV Van, and 
has secured work lost by other GM plants. It enjoys a generally good reputation in the industry, 
and has received positive press for its labor-management relations. 
Appendix One 
Automotive Supplier Study 
Supplier Survey Questionnaire 
OFFICE FOR THE STUDY OF 
AUTOMOTIVE TRANSPORTATION 
David E. Cole, Director 
Telephone (31 3) 764-5592 
FACSIMILE (313) 936-1 081 
The University of Michigan 
Transportation Research Institute 
2901 Baxter Road 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-2150 
August 1989 
Dear Automotive Executive: 
For a number of years the Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation 
has sponsored, organized, and participated in programs and research focusing 
on automotive customer-supplier relationships. We have been particularly 
interested in the industry role of the small supplier. In 1988, with the cooperation 
of General Motors Corporation, we organized a small supplier forum bringing 110 
suppliers together with key GM purchasing executives. In 1988 we also presented 
a panel, "The Small Automotive Supplier in the Future Competitive 
Environment," a t  the University of Michigan International Automotive 
Conference. Because of strong interest, a second International Automotive 
Conference small supplier workshop was organized in  1989, "The 
Customer/Small Supplier Relationship: Managing the Transformation." 
We have been asked by many suppliers t o  organize an  on-going supplier 
communication forum independent, but complementary, to the activities 
sponsored by vehicle manufacturers, trade and professional associations, and 
others. This forum could facilitate company-specific supplier forums (e.g., the 
GM purchasing forum), specialized research, and other information gathering 
and dissemination activities. 
In an attempt to best serve both suppliers and the vehicle manufacturers, it 
was suggested that we survey the supplier base to  see how suppliers gather and 
use information and what additional types of information would be useful. We 
believe the attached questionnaire addresses these issues and will provide a base 
for potential program planning. 
We greatly appreciate your time and effort in completing this survey. The 
results of this survey will be sent to the purchasing groups of the vehicle 
manufacturers and will be used for our internal planning. This survey will be 
conducted in strict confidence-we are not asking specific company name or 




OfEce for the Study of Automotive Transportation 
Automotive Supplier Survey 
August 1989 
Background Information 
1. From what perspective will you be answering this questionnaire? Except were 
indicated, we will appreciate you answering all the questions from this perspective. 
I am representing (please check): 
[ 1 My entire company 
[I My company's entire automotive activities 
[ 1 My individual group or division 
2. Approximately what is your total company employment (please check): 
[ I  1-100 
[ I  101-250 
[ I  251-500 
[ I  501- 1,000 
[ I  over 1,000 
3. Approximately what were your total company 1988 sales (please check)? 
[ I  less than $1 million 
[ I  $1 million to $50 million 
[ I  $51 million to $100 million 
[ I  $100 million to $500 million 
[ 1 $501 million to $1 billion 
[ 1 over $1 billion 
4. Roughly what percent of your e n h  company (including your operations and any 
other automotive activities) sales were: 
a Direct to vehicle manufacturers? 70 
b. To other automotive suppliers for 
incorporation into products ulti- 
mately sold to the manufacturers? yo 
5. Did your fiscal 1988 wtomotive sales increase of decrease from fiscal 1987 (please 
check)? 
[ I  Increase [ I  Decrease 
6. Roughly what percent of your 1988 total automotive sales was exported h m  the 
United States? % 
7. Roughly what percent of your 1988 raw materials, parts, and component 
purchases were sourced from outside the United States b d  Canada? YO 
8. In what year did your did you begin automotive operations? 
9. Please enter the code (from the list on page 6) of the three mllin products (by fiscal 
1988 sales) you supply the vehicle manubcturers for installation on-board new 
vehicles 
10. Please enter the code (from the list on page 6) of the three main products (by fiscal 
1988 sales) your company supplies other automotive suppliers for eventual 
installation on-board new vehicles. 
11. Which of the following North American vehicle manufacturers do you supply 
directly (please check): 
a. [ ] General Motors 
b. [ I  Ford Motor 
c. [ I  Chrysler Motors 
d. [ I  Honda 
e. [ I  Nissan 
f. [ I  Subaru-Isuzu 
g* I NIJMMI 
h. [ 1  Diarnond-Star 
i. [ I  Mazda 
j. [ 1 Toyota 
k [ I  Hyundai 
1. [ 1  GM-Suzuki (CAMI) 
lla Of these vehicle manufacturers, please indicate your largest customer (by sales 
d o h  amount): 
12. Please list other vehicle manufacturers you supply: 
Sources of Supplier Information 
13. How does your company collect information on the Big 3? How effective do you 
feel these individual methods are? Please check the appropriate box with l=least 
effective, 3=moderately effective, 5=m-t effective, and NA=not applicable. 
l[Rast Modemtely Most 
IEg- Effective l2a&Y!2 
Big 3 Customer: 
Buyer/purchasing agent [ ] N.A. [I] 121 131 [41 [51 
contacts 
Advanced R&D [lN.A. [I] 121 131 141 151 
Engineering f1N.A. [ll P I  [31 141 151 
OEM policymaker: 
Personal contact [ l N . k  111 [21 [31 141 [El 
Industry conferences [ I N.A. [ll 121 [31 141 I51 
Big 3 company efforts [ I N A  [ll 121 131 141 151 
Personal contacts [ I N.A [ll 121 131 [41 151 
Industry Trade Press 
Automotive Engineering [ 1 N.k 
Automotive Industry [ 1 N.k 
Automotive News 1 1 N.A. 
Metal Working News [ 1 P a  
Ward's Auto World [ 1 N.k 




Business Week [ 1 N A  
Forbes [ I N * k  
Fortune [ 1 N.k 
Wall Street Journal 1 I N.k 
A
Other Media [ 1 N.k 
Professional socie tidtrade associations 
AIAG [ 1 N.A [I] [21 131 141 15 
Em 1 I N.A. 111 121 131 141 151 
SAE [ I N.A. Ill [21 [31 [41 151 
SME [ I N.k [ll P I  131 141 151 
Other 111 [21 131 141 [El 
Other 111 P I  131 141 E51 
ha!& Moderately Most 
JBecti= Effecti= Effective 
Your internal corporate activities 
Strategic planning staff [ 1 N.A. 111 [21 131 [dl 151 
Central marketing staff [ ] N.A. [I] [21 C31 141 151 
Sales personnel feedback [ ] N.A. 111 [21 C31 C41 [51 
14. Within your company, what internal mechanisms are used to distribute auto 
industry information? 
15. What are the most significant problems your company faces in its direct 
customer relationships? 
15a Of these problems, which is the most significant? 
16. What are your company's major competitive threats? 
16a. Of these threats, which is the most si@cant? 
17. What are your company's mqjor competitive opportunities? 
17a. Of these opportunities, which is the most significant? 
18. Please list and evaluate the benefits of OEM-sponsored manuihcturer/supplier 
communication efforts? Please check the appropriate box where knot effective, 
3=moderately effective, and 5=extremely effective. 
Not Moderately Ektremely 
lixkb?e l3awh lBkdke 
111 121 131 141 [ a  
111 121 131 141 [53 
19. Please list and evaluate the benefits you see in mating and operating an 
ongoing, independent supplier/manufacturer communication forum. Please check 
the appropriate box where knot effective, 3=moderately effective, and 5=extmmely 
effective. 
Not Moderately Egtremely 
lak.th lswiYe Effective 
111 121 131 [4l [3 
111 121 131 141 [a 
HI [21 r31 141 csl 
111 121 131 141 153 
20. Other comments you may have on supplier/manufacturer relationships and 
communication efforts. 
- -  - 
Thank you. 
ENGINE - A0 
Balance shells - At 
Camshalts . A2 
Connecting rods - A3 
Crankshall . A4 
Cylinder b lwk  . A5 
Cylinder hoed and cover - A6 
Exhausl man~lotd - A7  
Flywheel . A8 
Intake manifold . A9 
Oll pumpllubrlcatlon . A10 
Plston nngs - A1 1 
Pislon - A12 
Valve Pain components - A13 
Waler pump - A14 
Other . A15 
BODY STRUCTUREIBUMPERSIGLISS - CO 
Bumper assembl~es . C1 
Cowl, dash, sill, plllar stampings - C2 
Frame - C3 
Glass (fixed and movable) . Gi 
Mtsc. small slampings (brackets, etc.) - C5 
Underbady, hood, rml,  deck, fender, 
quenar panel stamping . Cb 
Weather stripping, seals - C7 
Olhw - Cd 
STEERING AND SUSPENSDN EO 
Front wheel drive sus. assemMle8 - E l  
Front whoel knuckle - €2 
Powor steering pump . E3 
Shock a b s ~ b o n  - €4 
Springs . E5 
Slablllzernorslon b a n  . E6 
Sleerlng column - E7 
Steering gear box - E8 
Sleerlng wheel end horn pad . €9 
Struts - E l 0  
Suswnsicn control arms - E l  1 
Other . €12 
ENGINE ELECTRICAL . GO 
Alternator - G I  
Coil - G2 
Cruke Contrd - G3 
Dlslributor - G4 
Engine wiring harness - G5 
Lgnltlon modulo and nssc. wntrok . GB 
Spark plug - G7 
Stener motor - G8 
Other - GB 
BRAKES, WHEELS, AND TIRES - 10 
&aka d k  - I1 
Brake t uba  and hosm - 12 
Callper assembly - 13 
D N ~ S  - !4 
Master cylinder - IS 
Shws, Ilnings, and pads - I 
Tires - I7 
Wheda . 18 
Other - 10 
CHASSIS ELECTRICAL - KO 
Audio - Kt 
Battery - K2 
Electrkal Instrument controk - K3 
Fusm, twltchm, elc. . K4 
LanlpI . K5 
Main body wlre harness - K6 
Small rloclric molon - K7  
Omrr . KB 
TRANSMISSIONITRANSAXLE - 8 0  
Clutch assembly 81 
CV joints - 02 
Dlfferenlial assemblies - 03  
Drive shalt - 04 
Gear sols . B5 
Toque convener - 06 
Transmlsslon case - 07 
Olhor - 08 
SEATS, lNTERlORlEXTERlOR TRIM . DO 
Exterior llnirh trlmlornamenlatlon D l  
Grille panel . D2 
Headlinorlcarpellngltrlm panels . D3 
Inst. paneUmnsole assembly - D4 
Interlor llnlsh solt lrlm - D5 
lnteriorlexlerlor mirrors - D6 
Occupanl safeylrestralnl systems - D7 
Rough harbware (hinges, elc.) - D8 
*I coven - W 
Soat Iromes rnd m o c h ~ l o  - D l 0  
Other - D l  1 
FUEL DELIVERY srsrrws . PO 
Carburelor - F1 
Eloaronk luel Injector unl8 - F2 
Fuel I n w o n  . F3 
Fuel line# F4 
Fuel pump. - F5 
F w l  lank and Illlor tube - F6 
Turbacharvn - F7 
Other - FO 
EXHAUST AND EYISSDNS HO 
Catalytic converter - H I  
G h u t  p i p  - H2 
Muflbr - H3 
0 t h ~  - K( 
HEATINQ, VENTING, AIR CONDITIONING. JO 
Compressor - J1 
Condensor - J2 
Healer c o n  - J3 
Radlalw fan . J4 
Radirlor J5 
Other - J6 
OTHER COMPONENTS LO 
Boarings - L l  
Bet8 - L2 
Faalenon. clamps, bolo, OK.  - U 
Gaskern, ndr~ee.tves, c m ~ t c a r  . ~4 
Palnl, p l u l k ,  vinyl . L5 
Filler usembtles . L8 
Sloel - L7 
W l p w k u h r r  systems - La 
Omrr - LP 
Appendix Two 
Automotive Opportunities Project 
Personal Lnteniew Instrument and "Plant Map" 
University of Michigan 
Transportation Research Institute 
Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation 
Automotive Opportunities Project 
OSAT has contracted with a Michigan Foundation to examine the possibilities for new automotive 
product markets that may be available to a regionally concentrated set of automotive plants. A 
parallel project is examining nonautomotive opportunities that may exist for these and other 
regional plants. Both projects are designed to assist local economic planners in decreasing the 
dependence of the region's economy upon one automotive company and the automotive industry in 
general. 
Today we'd like to explore your ideas and suggestions as to what might be done with this 
concentrated group of about a dozen automotive plants. These plants all belong to one company 
(GM), and that imposes some realistic constraints upon what is feasible. But we'd like you to 
adopt two viewpoints throughout our discussion. The first is that of the new CEO of a company 
consisting of these twelve plants: what business opportunities and efforts would you pursue to 
enhance the company's survivability? The second is that of a community economic development 
specialist: viewing this as the most important economic base of the community, what might the 
community do to ensure its success, thereby preserving jobs and economic activity? 
We are particularly concerned with identifying any potential synergies that might exist within this 
group of plants. Are there any product lines available to the plants as a group, that might 
realistically be unavailable to any single plant in the p u p ?  
We recognize that time and information do not permit the development of a business strategy for 
these plants. What we hope to discover today are some initial ideas and possibilities. Suggestions 
of questions that need to be asked, of ways to narrow the possibilities, and of issues that must be 
addressed are important to us. 
The accompanying chart suggests the flow of value-added through the automotive production 
chain, identifying each plant by name and providing some pertinent information, including its 
current major product areas. Please take a moment to look this over, and then we'd like to ask you 
some questions. 
1 .  What do you see as the major changes likely in the automotive business 
over the next five years or  so? In particular, what are likely to be the promising 
product growth areas, and what are likely to be areas of shrinkage? 
2 .  A. Which of these plants, if any, face particular threats to their current 
lines of business, from industry restructuring, technological developments, new 
competition, declining markets, or the like? B. Who are some of the likely major 
competitors to these plants? 
3 .  Are any of these plants positioned so that they might face unusually high 
current o r  near-term opportunity, whether from industry restructuring, 
technological developments, declining competition, or  expanding markets? 
4 .  Thinking of particular business areas, are there threats or opportunities 
specific to any of these plants, or the set, from: 
i. increased electronic content? 
ii. material changes, including increased plastic content? 
iii. Changes in powertrain design and production? 
iv. Changes in manufacturing technology or approaches, including 
machining or stamping requirements? 
5 .  Considering this set of plants as a whole, which ones are most critical, in 
theory, to maintenance of the entire set as a functioning collection? That is, 
which plants are really the critical core of the set? 
a .  What, if any, are the major threats facing these core plants? 
b .  What, if any, major opportunities may exist or develop for these core 
plants? 
6 .  Again, considering this set of plants as a whole, which ones are least 
critical, in theory, to maintenance of the entire set as a functioning collection? 
That is, which plants are the most marginal to the rest of the set? 
7 .  Does this set of plants appear to possess any special advantages or 
disadvantages in today's competitive environment? 
8 .  Are there promising nonGM automotive opportunities for these plants, 
either at other manufacturers, or in the supplier chain? 
9 ,  Are there threats that might be avoided, or opportunities that might be 
secured, if these plants can cooperate in seeking business? 
10. How might such a concentration of plants influence supplier site location 
decisions? 
a .  Does it represent an attraction, or a "pulltt factor for suppliers 
seeking new site locations? What types of suppliers might see such an area as 
attractive? 
b. Does it represent a negative attribute for suppliers seeking site locations? 
What types of suppliers might see such a concentration of facilities as  
unattractive? 
11. On balance, what steps should these plants pursue to accentuate any 
advantages, or to mute any disadvantages, they might possess? What key success 
factors would you emphasize as CEO of this "company"? 
a .  Are there any process-linked, organizationally based strategies that 
you might pursue -- for example, machining or stamping? 
b .  These plants are well situated with regard to many vehicle assembly 
plants. Is such proximity an advantage? If it is, how might you try to leverage it? 
12. Looking at this set of plants as a community resource, what would you, as 
a community economic development specialist, emphasize in your efforts to assist 
specific plants or this entire set of plants to accentuate their advantages andor  to 
mute their disadvantages? 
13.  Does GM's structure and divisional lines pose major barriers to these 
plants developing cooperative joint strategies? 
1 4 .  What supplier firms are likely to be adding capacity in the next five years 
or so, whether to replace existing facilities or to add capacity? 
Thank you for your time and effort. 
FLINT, MICHIGAN PLANT MAP 
AClRochester 
World Headquarters. Fuel pumps, spark plugs, instrument displays, electronic vehicle 
controls, plastic moldings. 8,800 (1200 skilled), 1,000 salaried. 
Flint Manufacturing (ACIR) 
Exhaust manifolds, gas tanks, engine valves, engine covers, oil pans, SMC parts, some 
plastic gas tanks. 3,500 hourly (875 skilled), 500 salaried. 
Coldwater Road (F-G) 
Window regulators, rear deck starnpings, door hinges, headliners, small stampings. 1400 
hourly, 300 salaried. Major quality recognition. 
CPC Engine 
5.0,5.8L V-8; flywheels and water pumps c. 2,000 
employees. 
Flint Met Fab 
Engine cradles, exterior sheet, and structural 




4100 hourly, 400 salaried 
Axle (Partly H-M) 
Water pumps, pistons, engine covers, stamp manifolds, suspension and brake parts. 1900 
hourly (600 skilled), 100 salaried. H-M in 7/88: 2/3 of employees: 125 Canier; gears, 
pinions. 
Hydra-matic 
Shafts, gears, gear sets, and torque converters. 2900 Hourly, 300 salaried, 
Delco Products 
Springs. 250 total employment. 
BOC Engine 
3.0 and 3.8L, blocks, heads, machines cranks and cams. 
3300 hourly, 700 salaried. 
Gran ~d BIanc Stamping 
Responsible for Tooling plant; Now part of 
Cadillac. Large exterior sheet, doors, 
decklids, floorpans. 3,000 hourly (43% 
skilled), 450 salaried. 
Buick City Assembly 
H-body LeSabre, 
Delta 88: two shifts. 
Appendix Three 
Listing of U.S.-Based Automotive Suppliers with a Japanese Ownership Position 
(available on request fmm OSAT) 
Listing of the Largest U.S. Automotive Suppliers 
Listing of  the 
Largest U.S. Automotive Suppliers 













Automotive: Southfield, MI 
Dana Corporation 
Toledo, Ohio 





Automotive: Troy, Michigan 
Estimated 
Automotive Sales 
$9.3 billion (1988 tires and 
transportation sales) 
$4.1 billion (1988) 
$3.9 billion (1988 vehicular 
sales) 
$3.5 billion (1987 total 
corporate sales - bought by 
Bridgestone) 
$3.4 billion (1988 total 
corporate sales) 




Tires, belts, hoses, tubing, 
chemicals, molded plastics 
Brake systems, turbochargers, 
fuel injection systems, ignition 
components, restraint systems 
Axles, differentials, drive 
shafts, clutches, hydraulic and 
engine components, 
Air springs, molded rubber 
products, bumpers, rubber 
pads 
Engine valve train com- 








Well respected for product 
development and customer- 
support. International 
manufacturing and R&D 
facilities (including Japan). 
Considered a first tier, 
systems supplier. Has 
capable internal design, 
engineering, and 
manufacturing skills. 
Known for customer support. 
Has built small satellite 
facilities to supply vehicle 
assembly plants. Strongest in 
heavy trunk markets. 
Owned by Bridgestone Tire 
(Japan). Now has financial 
support but is considered 
weaker than Goodyear or 
Mic helin's 
Considered a first tier, 
systems supplier. Strong 
R&D support in Detroit area. 
International presence may 
supply vehicle manufacturers 
world wide. 
Well respected power 
transmission manufacturer. 















AMP, Inc. Automotive- 

















$ 3.1 billion (1988) 
$2.3 billion (1987 total 
corporate sales) 
$2.1 billion (1986) 
$ 2  billion (1987 total 
corporate sales) 
$2 billion (1987 total 
corporate sales) 
$ 1.8 billion (1986 tire and 
plastics sales) 
$ 1.7 billion (1988) 
Components  
Produced 
Occupant restraint systems, 
steering and suspension 
systems, engine components 
Sensor components, 
connectors, and multiplexing 
components 
Anti-lock brake systems; 
electrical, suspension, 
steering, and body hardware 
components, 
Air conditioning components, 
hoses and assemblies 
Tires, chemicals, plastics. 
Seating and interior 
components, plastic and 
fiberglas molded exterior 
panels. 
Brake system components; 
seat and interior trim parts; 
steering systems; fuel injection 
and electronic control 
components. 
Comments  
A first tier, full systems 
supplier in many areas. 
Single source of many Ford 
occupant restraint systems. 
Strong R&D. 
Would be a strong partner for 
any automotive electronics 
program. 
Teves an6-10ck brake system 
is standard on many high 
performance vehicles. Has 
strong financial and 
international strengths 
High quality reputation. Not 
considered a "systems 
supplier" but produces key 
components and does that 
well. 
Acquisition by Michelin soon 
to be completed. Fairly strong 
in original equipment sales, 
however this is based on price 
and not innovation like 
Goodyear, Michelin, and 
Bridgestone. 
Panel supplier to GM APV 
van. 
A first tier, full systems 
supplier in many areas. 
Strong R&D activity in 
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The U.S.-Japan Bilateral 1993 Automotive Trade Deficit 
The University of Michigan Delphi V Forecast and Analysis of the U.S. Automotive Industry 
Through the Year 2000: Volume One Marketing, Volume Two Technology 
Automotive News Roster of Auto F h s  and Executives 
Automotive Industries Automotive OEM Source Guide 
OSAT Vehicle Program Cycle Charts 
OSAT Engine Program Cycle Charts 
OSAT Japanese Automotive Supplier Investment Directory 
(These publications are available on request from OSAT) 
